

## The Influence of Schelling on Polish Thought in the First Half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century

Wpływ Schellinga na myśl polską pierwszej połowy XIX wieku

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**Abstract:** The paper presents the influence of F. W. J. Schelling's philosophy on Polish thought in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. I analyze the works of, among others, J. K. Szaniawski, J. Gołuchowski, M. Mochnacki, M. Wiszniewski, B. Trentowski, K. Libelt, or A. Cieszkowski. The presented research aims to demonstrate that Schelling's philosophy of nature, his philosophy of the ages of the world, and his critique of Hegel's absolute rationalism were a significant and profound source of inspiration for these thinkers and, in some cases (Gołuchowski, Trentowski), affected the very foundations of their philosophical systems. This influence contributed to Polish Romanticism gaining both speculative depth and self-awareness of its identity.

**Keywords:** German idealism; Schelling; Polish romantic thought

**Abstrakt:** W artykule omówiony został wpływ Schellinga na myśl polską pierwszej połowy XIX wieku. Analizuję w nim teksty działających w tym okresie autorów, takich jak: J. K. Szaniawski, J. Gołuchowski, M. Mochnacki, M. Wiszniewski, B. Trentowski, K. Libelt czy A. Cieszkowski. Celem moich badań jest wykazanie, iż schellingiańska filozofia przyrody, filozofia epok świata oraz krytyka absolutnego racjonalizmu Hegla stanowiła dla nich głębokie i ważne źródło inspiracji, która w pewnych przypadkach (Gołuchowski, Trentowski) dotyczyła samych podstaw ich systemów filozoficznych. Wpływ ten przyczynił się do uzyskania przez polski romantyzm zarówno spekulatywnej głębi, jak i samoświadomości swojej tożsamości.

**Słowa kluczowe:** idealizm niemiecki; Schelling; polska filozofia romantyczna

Although Hegel and his influence on Polish thinkers in the 19<sup>th</sup> century are better known and more widely recognized, Schelling's philosophy also played a significant role in the development of Polish thought during this period. Schelling's philosophical ideas had a profound impact on the young Mickiewicz and the early stages of Polish romanticism. They also served as vivid sources of inspiration for Polish critics of Hegel's absolute idealism of the 1830s and 1840s, as well. One of these critics, Bronisław Trentowski, in a scientific letter written in April 1842 to the Polish journal *The Advocate of Science* (*Orędownik Naukowy*) describes Schelling as "undoubtedly the greatest genius of our times" and "a philosophical giant, a Briareus having one hundred creative heads instead of one hundred arms, who provided the elements (...) for all philosophical systems which have emerged over the last 50 years" (Trentowski 2014, 378). He credits Schelling with founding a philosophical school unparalleled before or since, consisting of "only original heads and creators of independent systems", among them thinkers such as Oken, Steffens, Eschenmayer, and Hegel himself (Trentowski 2014, 386). As Trentowski states, he spent the most delightful moments of his life studying Schelling's thought, referring to this period his own "heaven on earth", an experience he believed he would likely never relive (Trentowski 2014, 387).

In this paper, I will examine examples of the most representative works of Polish thinkers of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. My aim is to demonstrate that Schelling's ideas, which circulated among Polish philosophers of the time, significantly shaped their views and, in some cases, influenced the very foundations of their systems, in particular in the following areas:

1. Schelling's philosophy of nature and the Romantic vision of living nature;
2. Schelling's later concept of three successive ages of the world;
3. Schelling's critique of Hegel's absolute rationalism.

## **I. Polish early romantic philosophy**

Polish philosophy at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was heavily influenced by Enlightenment thinking. This paradigm of thought referred to the empirical epistemology of Locke and Hume, according to which the senses are the only source of knowledge. Their representatives were critical towards all types of speculative thinking. As a consequence, they did not accept the a priori method or any forms of transcendental deduction, which were essential for German idealist philosophy from Kant to Hegel.

For instance, Jan Śniadecki, an uncompromising adversary of German idealist thought and a significant figure in Polish educational authorities during

the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, regarded Kant's ideas as metaphysical. However, German idealist philosophy gradually gained increasing recognition in Poland. As Andrzej Walicki puts it,

Philosophical maximalism was coming into being in Poland along with the reception of classical German philosophy. The direct predecessors of the philosophical movement of the 1840s were thinkers who began (...) in the pre-uprising period, referring above all to Schelling's philosophy: Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski, Józef Gołuchowski, and Maurycy Mochnacki. Taking into consideration their literary inclinations and their dependence on Schelling – a philosopher closely tied to German Romanticism – they can be called representatives of “philosophical Romanticism” of the pre-uprising age (Walicki 1977, 14).

Gołuchowski was not the first Polish thinker who “informed compatriots about Schelling's philosophy and underwent his influences” (Harassek 1924, 119). Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski in his *Friendly Advice to a Young Devotee of Science and Philosophy Seeking a Surer Path to True and Higher Enlightenment*, published for the first time in Warsaw in 1805 and for the second time in Lviv in 1823, “recommended a young philosophy researcher to diligently read Schelling's works”. According to Szaniawski, in Schelling's absolute idealism, “speculation (...), driven to the step of despair after so many vain trials, and trying to exceed itself, merges all diversities into one identity (...); destroys all contradictions”, such as subject and object, thought and the object of thought, form and matter, freedom and necessity, the ideal and the real world, the boundless and the limited, and “raises the researcher to the point of an absolute indifference with regard to them (Indifferentia)” (Harassek 1924, 120; see also Szaniawski 1823, 220-221). As Szaniawski further explained, “This theory leads to the ultimate boundaries of abstraction, and wears out all the efforts that can be undertaken on the dogmatic-speculative way, in order to dig out the corner-stone of all truth” (Szaniawski 1823, 221), and by joining rational intuition and fertile fantasy, “re-creates, builds and extracts nature” (Szaniawski 1823, 221). In the treatise *On the Nature and Purpose of Public Offices in Society*, published in 1808, Szaniawski admits that he owes much to the adherents of Schelling's school of thought, although he does not refer to them frequently (Harassek 1924, 120). However, it was Gołuchowski who knew Schelling, formed a lasting friendship with him until his death, and is considered one of the direct forerunners of Romantic philosophy in Poland.

Gołuchowski was born in 1797. He had expressed his interest in German idealist thought already in his first treatise, *View of the Influence of Mathematics on Human Education*, written in 1816 at the end of the mathematical studies in Vienna (Zabieglik 2003-2004, 123; see Filutowska 2020, 23-24). He

knew Schelling's earlier thoughts, particularly from the period of the philosophy of identity, and he was very well prepared for his meeting with the German thinker that took place at the end of 1821 in Erlangen, where Gołuchowski spent the first half of 1822 (he returned to Warsaw on August 20<sup>th</sup>; Zabieglik 2003-2004, 129). During this time, he made friends with Schelling, and published a treatise *Philosophy in its Relation to the Life of Entire Nations and Individuals*. Though there is no proof that Gołuchowski was acquainted with Schelling's middle philosophy and his idea of a so-called living system in 1821, Gołuchowski's competition dissertation from that year, written to obtain the philosophy professorship in Vilna, contains several remarks that suggest a close relationship between his philosophical views and German idealism, particularly Schelling's ideas (Vabalaitė 2012). For instance, he claims that "in sciences, the cosmic system repeats itself (...) which is the basis for the worlds" (Kozanecki 1962, 301), and that philosophy is the central principle of this system. He states that "the highest objects can be understood only by the heart" (Kozanecki 1962, 305) and that "the great and sublime Idea of life" has absolute priority over all sciences which are merely their supplement and development as true philosophy is the same as life. Gołuchowski thinks within the framework of the romantic paradigm of the objectivization of an absolute spirit through the successive stages of the development of nature, from "a dead mass of inorganic beings" through plants and animals, to human beings, identifying life with the principle of this process (Kozanecki 1962, 297).

In the German treatise, published in Erlangen in 1822, and in the inaugural lecture of 27 October 1823, Gołuchowski's affinities to Schelling are even deeper and stronger. Gołuchowski operates within the framework of the heavily idealistic, living paradigm of philosophy, according to which all things have their sources in the absolute, original unity. The philosopher is not concerned with empirical cognition and does not explore finite things, but seeks to investigate spiritual, eternal reality. Gołuchowski refers to Schelling's theory of intuition (*Anschauung*), or internal insight, which enables us to know eternal truths (Gołuchowski 1822, 139-140). Furthermore, in his political views, Gołuchowski is strongly influenced by Schelling's concept of an organic state, presented in his *Stuttgart private lectures* from 1810.

Schelling's ideas of living nature and the role of intuition and feeling in cognition had a great impact on Polish romantic thought. They significantly inspired Mickiewicz's *Ballads and Romances*, published in 1822 and considered the manifesto of Polish Romanticism. They also influenced Maurycy Mochnacki, particularly in his treatises *Thoughts on Polish Literature*, published in *The Polish Journal* in 1828 and *On Polish Literature in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, published in 1830. Mochnacki refers mostly to the *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (1797) or to Schelling's aesthetical views presented in *On the*

*Relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature* (1807). Similarly to Gołuchowski, he operates within the framework of the Schellingian paradigm of living nature, which achieves self-knowledge through a creative process that leads from the “silent rocks” to the “rational man” (Mochnacki 2000, 185). Mochnacki represents a highly romantic, idealistic, and reflective philosophy, based on the unity of nature and spirit, and emphasizes the role of self-knowledge, reflective thinking, and spirit in achieving the intellectual maturity of the nation.

Schelling's philosophy of nature also influenced Michał Wiszniewski, who competed with Gołuchowski for the professorship in Vilna in 1821. Although Wiszniewski was undoubtedly more open to German idealism than Jan Śniadecki, he was still a philosopher heavily anchored in the Enlightenment tradition. The Schellingian nature, which was not known through sensory experience and observation, but was deduced from the original principle “according to our own liking” (Wiszniewski 1976, 22), with eyes and ears covered, was therefore a rather odd concept for him. In his 1834 treatise *Bacon's Method of Interpreting Nature*, he takes a polemical stance against “Schelling's philosophy of nature and Oken's genetic method”, as he argues that they “want to explain hidden and unseen operations of nature through the eye of reason. It's not about inventing the laws of nature; it's not about showing how something is or how it happens, but how everything in nature happened” (Wiszniewski 1976, 19). To do this, they disregard observation and induction and attempt to “repeat the actions of the Almighty and changes of the ages only through thought” (Wiszniewski 1976, 19). In short, according to Wiszniewski, Schelling's philosophy of nature has a speculative character and therefore does not align with the scientific method proposed by Bacon. However, Wiszniewski also acknowledges that Schelling's method of deduction – both in the ideal and in the real line – has certain advantages. “Only today's philosophy, since the times of Schelling and Hegel, has been able to combine these two ways of reason” (Wiszniewski 1976, 123), that is, analytical thinking from the detail to the general, or from the senses to reason, and synthetical thinking from the general to the detail, or from reason to the senses, and therefore provides “the (...) unquestionable certainty” (Wiszniewski 1976, 123).

## **2. Later romantic systematicians: Trentowski, Libelt, Cieszkowski**

After the fall of the November Uprising in 1831, Polish philosophical life temporarily slowed down, though not for long. A new generation of philosophers gradually emerged on the Polish philosophical stage, fully belonging to the Romantic and idealist school of thought. The philosophical disputes between the adherents of the Enlightenment and the adherents of German idealism from

the 1820s had no direct influence on their worldview. They studied abroad, particularly in Germany, often personally knowing the most famous German thinkers, attending their lectures, and obtaining their academic degrees as their students – as did Karol Libelt, who wrote his doctoral thesis on pantheism in Berlin in 1830 under Hegel's guidance.

Bronisław Trentowski, born in 1808, participated as a soldier in the November Uprising and after its fall, in 1832, began his philosophical studies in Germany. Though Trentowski's thought was by no means a simple copy of either Schellingian or Hegelian ideas (see Starzyńska-Kościuszko2005), these philosophies heavily influenced the fundamental aspects of his thought from the very beginning. In 1837, he published a dissertation in German, *Foundation of Universal Philosophy*, based on which he obtained his doctoral degree from the University of Freiburg in 1836. This work focuses on epistemological issues and reveals a deep and significant understanding of the limitations of Hegel's approach, as well as the possibility of overcoming his absolute idealism by reuniting metaphysics with the empirical.

Trentowski begins with the assumption that "There are two sources of cognition: sensuality and reason" (Trentowski 1978, 17). Yet, considering that knowledge should be built upon one principle, he points out that all previous philosophical systems were either idealist, based on reason, or realist, based on the senses. After discussing the major modern philosophical concepts, from Descartes to Kant, he argues that Kant, who claimed that things in themselves cannot be known, only superficially reconciled these contradictory approaches. According to Trentowski, Kant's philosophy is in fact a higher-level realism, whereas Fichte made true efforts "to save noumenon and raise the dignity of the human spirit" (Trentowski 1978, 28). Schelling was the one who created a new system to solve the dispute between the empirical and the metaphysical by reconciling Kantian higher-level realism with Fichtean higher-level idealism. He did so by referring to the concept of intellectual intuition (Germ. *Intellektuelle Anschauung*), which is the source of true cognition, where "the identity of reason and senses, and the identity of the ideal and the real, is its object" (Trentowski 1978, 32-33; 206). In his epistemological theory, Trentowski identifies Schelling's intellectual intuition with apperception, or the third source of cognition, which "unites in itself receptive experience with the spontaneous reason" (Trentowski 1978, 194) and embodies the entire, living, divine truth, both external and internal.

This is the key topic of the entire work, as according to Trentowski, uniting these two aspects of knowledge is the most important task of the "today's philosophy", which remains divided between realism and idealism, between the empirical and the metaphysical, between the philosophy of nature and Hegel's philosophy of spirit, or between "the subject-objective and real philosophy",



and “subject-objective and ideal philosophy” (Trentowski 1978, 48-49). To support contemporary science, we must “join the subject-objectivity of the philosophers of nature with Hegel’s subject-objectivity and thus once again fuse realism and idealism” (Trentowski 1978, 52). However, this new unity cannot be “only absolute and formal, as it is in Schelling, but must at once be real and ideal” (Trentowski 1978, 52) – that is, true and essential.

Both in his doctoral dissertation and in the *Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature, or Transition from God to Creation according to the Principles of Universal Philosophy*, published in German in 1840, Trentowski refers to Schelling’s early works, in particular to the philosophy of nature and philosophy of identity. It seems he was well acquainted with early Schelling’s theories, as he not only discusses them in detail but also makes efforts to include them into his own system and to solve the philosophical problems that his great predecessors had left unsolved. He shows familiarity with the principles of Schelling’s transcendental deduction from *The System of Transcendental Idealism* from 1800 – that is, deduction along the ideal and real lines, the theory of the intellectual intuition, the concept of an original indifference of opposing elements in the absolute, and so on. Yet, the main conceptual framework of his dissertations from 1837 and 1840 still draws primarily on the philosophy of identity, although some statements in which Trentowski identifies science with God’s revelation (Trentowski 1978, 53) may suggest that he was at least aware of Schelling’s later ideas.

Trentowski was one of the most enthusiastic Polish adherents of Schelling’s philosophy and held Schelling in high regard. He compares Schelling to Socrates in ancient times, to the shining sun, and calls him “the philosopher as such, and the first true philosopher in Germany” (Trentowski 1978, 35), as Schelling was the first to “most deeply unite idealism with realism and in such a way approach the living divine reality” (Trentowski 1978, 35). However, Trentowski valued only Schelling’s early thought and was very critical towards his later philosophy, arguing that in his later work Schelling lost his autonomy as a philosopher and became entangled in “vain scholastic abstractions and (...) gnostic chimeras” (Trentowski 2014, 526).

Trentowski’s later works, written to the scientific journals in 1842 – shortly after Schelling began lecturing on his positive philosophy in Berlin – such as the scientific letter *About Schelling* and the short treatise *Schelling and Revelation* (a paraphrase of F. Engels’ work in German under the same title), confirm that he knew Schelling’s thought very well. In the scientific letter, written to briefly present Schelling’s ideas to the readers of *The Advocate of Science* Trentowski discusses the main tenets of Schelling’s philosophy. In his account, Schelling’s development can be divided into four stages, corresponding to the first, second, third, and fourth potency – this is a playful reference to Schell-

ing's own philosophical terminology, used in his living system, philosophy of mythology, and philosophy of revelation, where potencies or creative powers represent the successive stages of the creative process.

For Trentowski, both early Schelling up to 1801 (Schelling of the first potency) and Schelling up to 1806 (Schelling of the second potency) is a pantheist, as he attempts to reconcile nature and spirit, the real and the ideal, matter and God, and so forth. According to Trentowski, Schelling of the very first potency is a typical philosopher of nature, giving absolute priority to nature. This changes only in *The System of Transcendental Idealism*, published in 1800, where Schelling temporarily aligns his philosophical approach with that of Hegel, granting supremacy to the spirit over nature and beginning to claim that everything is spirituality dispersed throughout nature (Trentowski 2014, 390). Thus, while Schelling of the first potency inspired his adherent, Oken, in the second period, "Hegel was (...) with Schelling (...) one soul, one thought. He even attended the lectures of his younger friend, sitting with his pupils at the school desk" (Trentowski 2014, 390). Trentowski, who initially declares that he is not Schelling's pupil and does not know him personally (Trentowski 2014, 377), adds that he knows this detail from Schelling himself, "from the letter I received from him shortly after the publication of my first German work" (Trentowski 2014, 390).

To summarize, for Trentowski, Oken and Hegel are "the two most ultimate poles of Schelling's self" (Trentowski 2014, 393). Oken represents nature and the "empirical absolute", while Hegel represents spirit and the ideal absolute. Yet, according to Trentowski, Schelling's philosophy, even in this second potency, does not aim to be purely ideal; rather, it seeks to unite the ideal and the real. Its main focus is not subject-objectivity, but object-subjectivity (Trentowski 2014, 393). However, there is some doubt as to whether Schelling can truly be considered a representative of pantheism. In his transcendental deduction, the absolute self – or the so-called ideal activity – which undergoes the process of objectivization, never fully becomes an object (see Schelling 1978, 113). Therefore, throughout the entire process, ideal activity maintains its priority over deduction along the real line. In short, this is pantheism only in a very particular sense of the term. Yet Trentowski is undoubtedly correct in observing that pantheistic motifs are present in Schelling's early philosophy. Schelling was strongly influenced by Spinoza's pantheistic thought, and the philosophy of nature plays a crucial role both in his system of identity and his system of transcendental idealism.

According to Trentowski, Schelling of the third potency is little known even in Germany. After 1806, Hegel separated from him, developed his own speculative idealism, and became famous, while Schelling, after publishing his 1815 treatise *On the Deities of Samothrace*, "persistently kept silent for



19 years” (Trentowski 2014, 394), angered that “Hegel, from whom he rightly felt himself to be something greater, attracted the attention of the entire public” (Trentowski 2014, 394). Thus, when discussing Schelling’s philosophical approach from this period, Trentowski refers to several treatises, including *Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom* (1809). He does not mention *The Ages of the World*, as this unfinished work had not yet been published. However, he is aware that Schelling’s philosophy at this stage changes, introducing new topics such as the problem of creation, the relationship between God and the world, human freedom, individual existence, and so forth. Nevertheless, ideas related to the trinitological dialectics of the system of the ages of the world, or the philosophy of mythology and philosophy of revelation, are absent from this summary and are discussed by Trentowski only in his treatise *Schelling and Revelation*, in which he offers a brief overview of Schelling’s Berlin lectures. Furthermore, Trentowski defends Schelling against criticisms from the representatives of the Hegelian school. According to him, Schelling “was a naturalistic, spiritual, and theosophical pantheist” (Trentowski 2014, 425). Yet, Schelling of the fourth potency purified himself from pantheism and came to acknowledge a personal God, while still seeking to unify experience with speculation, material realism with pure idealism. According to Trentowski, this direction of thought is very promising for philosophical research and aligns with his own philosophy – on the condition that Schelling “will maintain philosophy in its (...) independence from theology” (Trentowski 2014, 426) and will not fall into supernaturalism or anthropomorphism.

Although this is somewhat inconsistent – since Trentowski, while excluding religious theology, is nevertheless influenced by Boehme’s theosophical views (Borzym 2000; see Trentowski 1978, 14-16) – he is “already a fully formed systematician” and is not “open to the new problems that could arise from Schelling’s considerations” (Borzym 2000, 198). This is confirmed in *Schelling and Revelation* (1842). Although Trentowski did not identify with the Left Hegelians, he nevertheless “decided to acquaint Polish public opinion” (Borzym 2000, 199) with the critique of Schelling’s positive thought prepared by Engels, one of their leading representatives. Furthermore, in the margins of his paraphrase of the original text, Trentowski added extensive remarks in which he discussed the differences between his later concepts, presented in *Chowanna*, and Schelling’s late thought. For instance, to properly reconcile experience with speculation, Trentowski postulates the existence of a third cognitive faculty, the so-called “mysł”, which mediates between the senses and the mind. While our knowledge of empirical things has an a posteriori character and constitutes an affirmative philosophy, our knowledge of intellectual things has an a priori character and constitutes a negative philoso-

phy, our knowledge concerning matters belonging to the third faculty has both an a priori and a posteriori character, constituting what he calls associating philosophy – or true philosophy – whose aim is the self, life and the creator (Trentowski 2014, 497).

Trentowski developed these ideas in his treatises *Myślini, or the Totality of National Logic* (1844) and *Chowanna, or the Totality of National Pedagogics* (1846), where he attempted to create a so-called national philosophy. He was at least partially inspired by Hegel, who believed that “philosophical genius does not live permanently in one nation or tribe” (Harassek 1935, 7) and, according to Trentowski, had already finished its mission in Germany and turned to the Slavic nations. Yet, although Trentowski invented and applied a great deal of new terminology in Polish, the main conceptual framework of his national philosophy retained a strongly universal character. He emphasized the universality and unity of spiritual truth and defended the autonomy of philosophy in relation to poetry. Thus, he “firmly opposed the idea of Polish folk-national philosophy, so heavily propagated by Libelt, and already prepared by Mickiewicz” (Harassek 1935, 12).

Karol Libelt was a philosopher associated with the Hegelian school, yet his approach was highly critical of the partiality of Hegel’s rationalism. In his works (e. g., in *System umniectwa*), he proposed supplementing Hegel’s “autocratic reason” and panlogism with a cognitive faculty such as creative imagination (Einbildungskraft). Such ideas are undoubtedly not of Hegelian origin and place Libelt’s thought closer to Kant’s aesthetics or Schelling’s views on mythology, as presented, among others, in *The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism* (1796)<sup>1</sup>, *The Ages of the World*, and his philosophy of mythology and revelation.<sup>2</sup> In particular, in the three unfinished versions of *The Ages of the World* (1811, 1813, and 1814–1815), Schelling sought to create a so-called living system, a mythopoetical history from the very beginning of all things, in which the philosopher was identified with the poet-historian who renders past events visible by recounting a direct narrative “from the holy dawn of the world” (Schelling 2019, 65). This type of discourse merges concepts and images, and does not draw a distinction between philosophy and poetry (see Filutowska 2021). Libelt’s folk-national philosophy, along with poetry and faith, was also to be firmly rooted in the “deep ocean of national spirit” (Harassek 1935, 12) and based on folk imagination and popular songs. According to Libelt, there is no philosophy other than national philosophy. The individual mediates between the general and the particular; thus, contrary

<sup>1</sup> However, this text has also been assigned to Hegel and Hölderlin (see McQuillan 2011).

<sup>2</sup> In his doctoral dissertation from 1837, Trentowski also claims that imagination is a „prae-creativity of spirit,” a “cradle of all originality,” and thus an integral part of reason (see Trentowski 1978, 140).

to dead, abstract thought, living, personal philosophy “is the unity of God’s thought (generality) and the nation (particularity)” (Libelt 2014, 227). There is no contradiction between the universality of philosophy and the particularity of the nation, because God’s wisdom reveals itself and achieves self-knowledge through particular nations.

Schelling’s lectures in Berlin between 1841 and 1842 sparked great interest among Polish philosophers. His inaugural lecture, delivered on 15 November 1841, was published in *The Warsaw Library* in February 1842, along with Cieszkowski’s commentary, and had a significant impact on Polish philosophers (Roskal 2022, 107). Edward Dembowski in 1842 and Jan Majorkiewicz in 1843 and in 1846 also wrote on Schelling’s positive philosophy in *The Scientific Review*.<sup>3</sup> Gołuchowski, who after his dismissal settled in Garbacz, thanks to Eleonora Ziemięcka – who “maintained literary relationships with Poles staying in Berlin” (Harassek 1924, 77) – visited Schelling again in Germany and, in February 1846, delivered a speech on the occasion of his birthday.

Many Polish thinkers of that time, representing various political orientations – e.g., such as Libelt, Trentowski, Gołuchowski, or Dembowski – shared the Schellingian critique of Hegel’s absolute rationalism. In his philosophy of act (*Philosophie der Tat*), August Cieszkowski also asserted the supremacy of practice and factual existence of reality over Hegel’s purely conceptual philosophy. This approach is similar to Schelling’s concept of so-called philosophical empiricism and his distinction between *was* (“what something is”) and *daß* (“that it is”). Although Cieszkowski was one of the most renowned Polish Hegelians, he was “in substantial agreement” with Schelling “on the particular question of the divine personality and the immortality of the soul” (Liebich 1979, 97), along with thinkers such as Gołuchowski. Cieszkowski’s critique of the inconsistencies in Hegel’s philosophy of history, presented in *Prolegomena to Historiosophy*, published in German in 1838, was inspired by his conversations on philosophy of history with Szaniawski, one of the most prominent Polish Schellingians (Walicki 1977, IX). According to Cieszkowski, Hegel’s division of history into four ages is inconsistent with the principles of the Hegelian dialectics. Therefore, he proposes to replace it with a division into three stages, well known from the Schellingian dialectic of the ages of the world, as only from this perspective it is possible to grasp the entirety of history speculatively and organically (Cieszkowski 2014, 7). Furthermore, he argues that Hegel excluded the future from the field of speculation due to a kind

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<sup>3</sup> See E. Dembowski, „Rys rozwinięcia się pojęć filozoficznych w Niemczech” (*Przegląd Naukowy*, III-IV, 1842); J. Majorkiewicz, „Rzuty filozoficzne” (*Przegląd Naukowy* I/ 1843); J. Majorkiewicz, „Schelling i Gołuchowski” (*Przegląd Naukowy*, III, 1846).

of philosophical superstition (Cieszkowski 2014, 7-8). Therefore, Cieszkowski undertakes a deduction of the future, yet according to the rules of the Hegelian dialectics. However, his observations – that at the first, natural, and blind level, the future often manifests itself as a presentiment or prophecy (Cieszkowski 2014, 12) – recall Schelling's idea that we perceive the third dimension of history through foretelling or divination (Schelling 2019, 55).

### 3. Conclusion

To sum up, in Poland in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Schelling's views found fertile ground. His influence on Gołuchowski, Mochnacki, Trentowski, Libelt, and Cieszkowski is clearly visible and, in some cases, concerns the most fundamental aspects of their philosophy. Schelling had a profound impact on Mickiewicz and Polish Romantic thinkers, such as Gołuchowski and Mochnacki. Although Trentowski remained critical of Schelling's later thought, he drew significant inspiration from his earlier views. Both Libelt and Cieszkowski shared the assumptions of the Schellingian critique of Hegel's panlogism. Furthermore, Schelling gave the systematic and speculative form to some essential Romantic ideas, such as the concept of living nature, which otherwise might have appeared only in purely poetic, unreflective expressions and would not have developed its full spiritual potential. Therefore, thanks to his thought, Polish romanticism – both poetical and philosophical – gained a spiritual horizon, speculative depth, and a profound self-awareness of its identity.

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