Keywords
the final argument
analogy
metaxy
oikeios logos
definition
eidos
idea
the logic of contraries
How to Cite
Abstract
The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.
References
Barnes, J., 1982, The Presocratic Philosophers, London.
Boys-Stones, G., 2004, «Phaedo of Relis and Plato on the soul», Phronesis 69 (2004), pp. 1–23.
Brancacci, A., 1990, Oikeios logos. La filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene, Napoli.
Brancacci, A., 1993, «La terza definizione nel Teeteto», in: A.M. Battegazzore (cur.), Dimostrazione, argomen¬tazione dialettica e argomentazione retorica nel pensiero antico, Genova, pp. 107–132.
Brancacci, A., 2010, «Aristotele e la dottrina del Teeteto», in: G. Mazzara, V. Napoli (cur.), Platone. La teoria del sogno nel Teeteto. Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Palermo 2008, Sankt Augustin, pp. 43–59.
Casertano, G., (cur.), 2015, Fedone, o dell’anima, dramma etico in tre atti, Napoli.
Casertano, G., 2018, «Phaedo – dramatic structure and philosophical content», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 17–27.
Casini, N. (cur.), 1965, Platone, il Fedone, Firenze.
Celluprica, V., 1987, «Antistene logico o sofista?», Elenchos 2, pp. 285–328.
Centrone, B. (cur.), 20106, Fedone, Introduzione e note aggiornate a M. Valgimigli (1931), Roma–Bari.
Dixsaut, M. (ed.), 1991, Platon, Phédon, Paris.
Dixsaut, M., 2010, «Logos et doxa», in: G. Mazzara, V. Napoli (cur.), Platone. La teoria del sogno nel Teeteto. Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Palermo 2008, Sankt Augustin, pp. 119–133.
Dixsaut, M., 2018, «La mort, estimons-nous que c’est quelque chose?», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 173–182.
Dorter, K., 2001, «“Deathless is indestructible, if not we need another argument”: an implicit argument in the Phaedo», in: A. Havlíček, F. Karfík (eds.), 2001, Plato’s Phaedo, Prague, pp. 406–422.
Ferber, R., 2018, «Deuteros Plous, the immortality of the soul and the ontological argument for the existence of God», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 221–230.
Ferrari, F., 2005, «L’accenno alle idee alla fine del Cratilo», in: G. Casertano (cur.), Il Cratilo di Platone, strut¬tura e problematiche, Napoli, pp. 115–123.
Frede, D., 1978, «The final proof of the immortality of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo 102a–107a», Phronesis 23, pp. 27–41.
Giannantoni, G., 1985, Socraticorum Reliquiae, vol. III, Napoli, pp. 225–226.
Gonzales, F., 2003, «Perché non esiste una “Teoria platonica delle idee”», in: M. Bonazzi, F. Trabattoni (cur.), Platone e la tradizione platonica, Milano, pp. 31–67.
Graham, D. W., 2018, «Plato’s Scientific Manifesto», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 262–267.
Karfik, F., 2018, «L’âme et la Forme de la vie», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 183–187.
Marcos de Pinotti, G. E., «¿Cuántos y quiénes “recuerdan”? El doble alcance de la reminiscencia en Fedón 72e–77a», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Sympo¬sium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 278–287.
Mársico, C., 2018, «Sombras de las polémicas intrasocráticas: Antístenes en la República a propósito de la críti¬ca homérica», in: M. Pulpito, P. Spangenberg (eds.), ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι – Ways to think. Essays in Honour of Néstor- Luis Cordero, Bologna, pp. 279–288.
Mazzara, G., 2010, «L’Aiace e l’Odisseo di Antistene come ipotesi di lettura della teoria del sogno e dei tre sensi di logos dati da Platone per interpretarla», in: G. Mazzara, V. Napoli (cur.), Platone. La teoria del sogno nel Teeteto, Atti del Convegno Internazionale, Sankt Augustin, pp. 225–262.
Mazzara, G., 2014, «La logica di Antistene nell’Aiace e nell’Odisseo», in: Vl. Suvák, Antisthenica Cynica Socra¬tica, Praha, pp. 121–167.
Mazzara, G., 2014, «Platone – Il motto di Delfi nell’Alcibiade I tra enfatizzazioni e ritrattazioni di Socratici», Peitho. Examina Antiqua, 1 (5), pp. 13–41.
Mazzara, G., 2018, «Platone di fronte a Parmenide, Gorgia ed Antistene nel Sofista», in: M. Pulpito, P. Spangenberg (eds.), ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι – Ways to think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero, Bologna, pp. 289–299.
Mazzara, G., 2019, «Platone e Antistene nel Fedone: una lettura in controluce. Parte Prima», Peitho. Examina atiqua, 1 (10), pp. 13–44.
Miura, T., 2018, «Immortality and imperishability of the soul in the final argument of Plato’s Phaedo», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 193–198.
O’Brien, D., 1967–1968, «The last argument of Plato’s Phaedo, I», The Classical Quarterly 17, pp. 198–231; II, Classical Quarterly 18, pp. 95–106.
Ogihara, S., 2018, «Immortality and eternity: Cebes’ remark at Phaedo 106d2–4», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robin¬son, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 199–204.
Palumbo, L., 2018, «Filosofia e narrazione. Il caso del Fedone», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 38–42.
Pradeau, J.-F., 2000, Platon, Alcibiade, Paris.
Rashed, M., 2006, «Platon, Sathon, Phedon», Elenchos 27, pp. 117–122.
Reale, G., 2000, Socrate. Alla ricerca della sapienza umana, Milano.
Reeve, M. D., 1975, «Socrates’ replay to Cebes in Plato’s Phaedo», Phronesis 20, pp. 199–208.
Rossetti, L., 2015, La filosofia non nasce con Talete, Bologna.
Rossetti, L., 2017, Un altro Parmenide, Vol. I–II, Bologna.
Rowe, C. J. (ed.), 19962, Plato, Phaedo, Cambridge.
Sedley, D., 2018, «The Phaedo’s final proof of immortality», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 210–220.
Tetamo, E., 2015, «Saggio critico», in: A. Tagliapietra (cur.), Fedone o Sull’anima, Milano, pp. 7–54.
Tomin, J., 2001, «Socrates in the Phaedo», in: A. Havlíček, F. Karfík (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo, Prague, pp. 140–173.
Tordo Rombaut, K., 2018, «Qu’est-ce qui, dans la question de l’anonyme, a pu troubler Socrate (Phd. 103a4–c5)?», in: G. Cornelli, Th. Robinson, F. Bravo (eds.), Plato’s Phaedo. Selected papers from the XI Symposium Platonicum, Baden-Baden, pp. 299–303.
Trabattoni, F., 1988, «La dottrina dell’anima-armonia nel Fedone», Elenchos 9, pp. 53–74.
Trabattoni, F., 2008, «Socrate, Antistene e Platone sull’uso dei piaceri» in: L. Rossetti, A. Stavru, Socratica 2005, Bari, pp. 235–262.
License
Peitho provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.