Keywords
Parmenides
epistemology
scepticism
fallibilism
infinity
How to Cite
Abstract
An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a “justified true belief” in order to be able to say that one has “knowledge.” As Xenophanes’ text has it, even if one were able to say something true, one would not know it yet. This is because, according to Xenophanes, no one is capable of grasping the evident truth of things, since only conjectures about everything are available. But while conjectures cannot rise above the level of pure opinion, they are not all equal: as DK 21 B 18 recognizes, they are perfectible. But what is the basis of this position, which oscillates between scepticism and fallibilism? Since perfectibility never reaches the end (namely the truth), this progress is infinite: the basis of Xenophanes’ epistemology may therefore be his physics of the infinite, which, however, is itself only a conjecture. This entails the risk of self-refutation. To avoid this peril, the doctrine of Parmenides will have to batten down the hatches.
References
Ayer, A. J., 1956, The Problem of Knowledge, London.
Boudouris, K. J. (ed.), 1989, Ionian Philosophy, Athens.
Brémond, M., 2020, “How did Xenophanes Become an Eleatic Philosopher?”, Elenchos 41, pp. 1–26. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2020-0001
Casati, R., 2011, Prima lezione di filosofia, Roma–Bari.
Corbato, C., 1952, “Studi senofanei. I. Senofane Eleate? II. Il pensiero di Senofane”, Annali Triestini 22, pp. 179–244.
Cordero, N.-L., 2013, “Jenófanes invitado a Elea por H. Diels (Diógenes Laercio, IX.18)”, in Leão, Cornelli, Peixoto 2013, pp. 101–108. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/978-989-721-042-6_7
Curd, P., Graham, D. W. (eds.), 2008, The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195146875.001.0001
Decleva Caizzi, F., 1974, “Senofane e il problema della conoscenza”, Rivista di Filologia e Istruzione Classica 102, pp. 145–164.
Finkelberg, A.,1990, “Studies in Xenophanes”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 93, pp. 103–167. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/311284
Fränkel, H., 1925, “Xenophanesstudien”, Hermes 60, pp. 174–192 (part. tr. “Xenophanes’ Empiricism and His Critique of Knowledge (B 34)”, in: A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, Princeton 1974, pp. 118–131).
Fränkel, H., 1962, Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums. Eine Geschichte der griechischen Epik, Lyrik und Prosa bis zur Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts, München.
Furley, D. J., Allen, R. E. (eds.), 1970, Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, London.
Gettier, E., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis 23, pp. 121–123. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/23.6.121
Gostoli, A., Velardi, R. (cur.), 2014, Mythologein. Mito e forme del discorso nel mondo antico. Studi in onore di Giovanni Cerri, Pisa.
Ioli, R., 2003, “Senofane B 34 DK e il conoscere”, Giornale Italiano di Filologia 55, pp. 199–219.
Laks, A., Most, G. W. (eds.), 2016, Early Greek Philosophy, vol. III.2: Early Ionian Thinkers, Cambridge–London.
Leão, D., Cornelli, G., Peixoto, M. (eds.), 2013, Dos Homens e suas Ideias. Estudos sobre as Vidas de Diógenes Laércio, Coimbra. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14195/978-989-721-042-6
Lesher, J. H., 1978, “Xenophanes’ Scepticism”, Phronesis 23, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/156852878X00181
Lesher, J. H., 1991, “Xenophanes on Inquiry and Discovery. An Alternative to the ‘Hymn to Progress’ Reading of Fr. 18”, Ancient Philosophy 11, pp. 229–248. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil19911121
Martano Jr., G. (cur.), 2002, Discorsi per Giuseppe Martano senior, Napoli.
McCoy, K., 1989, “Xenophanes’ Epistemology: Empirism Leading to Scepticism”, in: Boudouris 1989, pp. 235–240.
Messina, G., 2007, Dalla fisica di Senofane all’Empedocle di Strasburgo. Studi di filosofia presocratica, Bari.
Mogyoródi, E., 2006, “Xenophanes’ Epistemology and Parmenides’ Quest for Knowledge”, in Sassi 2006, pp. 123–160.
Mourelatos, A., 2008, “The Cloud-Astrophysics of Xenophanes and Ionian Material Monism”, in Curd, Graham 2008, pp. 134–168. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195146875.003.0005
Philippoussis, J., 1989, “The Gnoseological and Metaphysical Particularity of Xenophanes’ Thought”, in: Boudouris 1989, pp. 327–336.
Popper, K., 1970, “Back to the Presocratics”, in: Furley, Allen 1970, pp. 130–153.
Rossetti, L., 2002, “Parmenide e il ‘saper di sapere’”, in: Martano Jr. 2002, , pp. 147–158.
Rossetti, L., 2014, “Anassimene vs. Anassimandro”, in: Gostoli, Velardi 2014, pp. 160–167.
Rossetti, L., 2017, Un altro Parmenide, vol. I–II, Bologna.
Rossetti, L., 2020, Verso la filosofia: nuove prospettive su Parmenide, Zenone e Melisso, N.S. Galgano, S. Giombini, F. Marcacci (eds.), Baden-Baden. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5771/9783896659279
Sassi, M. M. (ed.), 2006, La costruzione del discorso filosofico nell’età dei Presocratici, Pisa.
Sassi, M. M., 2011, “Senofane fra i sofisti. Dai limiti della conoscenza (21 B34 DK) al paradosso eristico (Plat. Men. 80d5–e5)”, Méthexis 24, pp. 7–20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/24680974-90000576
Tor, S., 2013, “Mortal and Divine in Xenophanes’ Epistemology”, Rhizomata 1, pp. 248–282. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2013-0011
Tor, S., 2017, Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology. A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Parmenides, Cambridge–New York. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139235747
Turrini, G., 1982, “Il frammento 34 di Senofane e la tradizione dossografica”, Prometheus 8, pp. 117–135.
Untersteiner, M., 1956, Senofane. Testimonianze e frammenti, Firenze.
Vassallo, N., 2013, “Platone confutato in tre pagine”, Domenica de Il Sole24ore, 17 marzo.
Vitali, R., 2000, Senofane di Colofone e la scuola eleatica, Cesena.
Warren, J., 2007, Presocratics, Stocksfield. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653911
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Massimo Pulpito
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Peitho provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.