Mapping rhetorical dissent: a comparative analysis of the Obergefell opinions
Journal cover Comparative Legilinguistics, volume 64, no. 4, year 2025
PDF

Keywords

judicial rhetoric
dissenting opinions
Obergefell v. Hodges
constitutional discourse
Supreme Court
framing
legal reasoning
persuasion

How to Cite

Goźdź-Roszkowski, S. (2025). Mapping rhetorical dissent: a comparative analysis of the Obergefell opinions. Comparative Legilinguistics, 64, 430–450. https://doi.org/10.14746/cl.2025.64.3

Abstract

This paper offers a rhetorical analysis of the four dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that extended constitutional protection to same-sex marriage. Drawing on a ten-dimensional coding framework, the study investigates how Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito construct their dissenting positions not only in legal terms but as distinctive rhetorical performances. The framework includes appeals (ethos, logos, pathos), tone/style, framing devices, intertextuality, figurative language, rhetorical questions, identity and community appeals, and lexical polarity). While united in outcome, the dissents diverge sharply in form, intent, and audience. Roberts adopts a tone of institutional mourning; Scalia mounts a caustic protest; Thomas articulates a doctrinal and philosophical minimalism; and Alito warns against the erosion of pluralism and conscience rights. The analysis shows that judicial dissent operates on multiple discursive levels, revealing divergent conceptions of law, democracy, and cultural identity. By focusing on dissent as a rhetorical genre, this paper contributes to broader debates about constitutional discourse, the function of dissenting opinions, and the interplay between law and persuasion in pluralistic societies.

 

https://doi.org/10.14746/cl.2025.64.3
PDF

References

Alito, S. (2015). Dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/14-556.ZD4.html

Aristotle. (1991). The art of rhetoric (H. C. Lawson-Tancred, Trans.). Penguin Classics.

Boginskaya, O. (2022). Dissenting with conviction: Boosting in challenging the majority opinion. International Journal of Legal Discourse, 7, 257–279. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ijld-2022-2073

Cockroft, R., & Cockroft, S. (2014). Persuading people: An introduction to rhetoric (3rd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Frost, M. (2016). Introduction to classical legal rhetoric: A lost heritage. Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315251868

Gibson, K. L. (2012). In defense of women’s rights: A rhetorical analysis of judicial dissent. Women’s Studies in Communication, 35(2), 123–137. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07491409.2012.724526

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard University Press.

Goodrich, P.(1998). Legal hermeneutics. In The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis. Retrieved 22 Apr. 2025, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/legal-hermeneutics/v-1.

Goźdź-Roszkowski, S. (2020). Communicating dissent in judicial opinions: A comparative, genre-based analysis. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 33(2), 381–401. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09711-y

Goźdź-Roszkowski, S. (forth. in 2025). Indicators of confrontation in separate judicial opinions. An exploratory, pragma-dialectical Study. In S. Goźdź-Roszkowski & G. Pontrandolfo (Eds.), In the minds of the judges: Argumentative discourse at the intersection of law and language. De Gruyter Mouton. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111569628

Halliday, M. A. K. (1973). Explorations in the functions of language. Arnold.

Hume, R. J. (2019). Disagreeable rhetoric, shaming, and the strategy of dissenting on the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice System Journal, 40(1), 3–20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0098261X.2019.1598901

Hunston, S., & Thompson, G. (Eds.). (1999). Evaluation in text: Authorial stance and the construction of discourse. Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198238546.001.0001

Kelemen, K. (2019). Judicial dissent in European Constitutional courts. A comparative and legal perspective. Routledge.

Kuypers, J. A. (2010). Framing analysis from a rhetorical perspective. In P. D’Angelo & J. A. Kuypers (Eds.), Doing news framing analysis: Empirical and theoretical perspectives (pp. 286–311). Routledge.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press.

Martin, J. R., & White, P. R. R. (2005). The language of evaluation: Appraisal in English. Palgrave Macmillan.

McKeown, J. (2022). Stancetaking in the US Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence (1973–present): Epistemic (im)probability and evidential (dis)belief. International Journal of Legal Discourse, 7(2), 323–343. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ijld-2022-2075

Nikitina, J. (forthcoming, 2025). Dialogical reasoning in separate judicial opinions: The path of negation. In S. Goźdź-Roszkowski & G. Pontrandolfo (Eds.), In the minds of the judges: Argumentative discourse at the intersection of law and language. De Gruyter Mouton. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111569628-009

Ohrvik, A. (2024). What is close reading? An exploration of a methodology. Rethinking History, 28(2), 238–260. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2024.2345001

Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. Political Communication, 10(1), 55–75. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1993.9962963

Roberts, J. (2015). Dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/14-556.ZD1.html

Scalia, A. (2015). Dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/14-556.ZD2.html

Thomas, C. (2015). Dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/14-556.ZD3.html