The critics of the John Hick's conception of the rational theistic belief without proof.

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Przemysław Strzyżyński

Abstract

The main point of this article is John Hick’s conception of rational theistic belief without proof and its critics. By the analogy between sense experience and religious experience Hick build the inference leading to conclusion that the religious experience is like sense experience reliable foundation for rationally of beliefs. So although religious beliefs have non proofs, for instance for existence of God, they are rational. Critics, like C. R. Brakenhielm, T. R. Mathis, R. W. Perrett review this inference and conclusion. Especially are attacking analogy between sense experience and religious experience, by negation of possibility of the private language and possibility of solipsistic alternative for sense experience.

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How to Cite
Strzyżyński, P. (2009). The critics of the John Hick’s conception of the rational theistic belief without proof. Filozofia Chrześcijańska, 6, 85-96. https://doi.org/10.14746/fc.2009.06.07
Section
Osoba i racjonalność

References

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