Abstract
The Taliban victory in Afghanistan in 2021 has not only raised geopolitical concerns but has also sparked questions about the state’s policies and strategies concerning its rare earth elements reserves. The main objective of the presented article is to indicate how the current political change in Afghanistan may affect the raw material policy regarding the extraction of rare earth elements, taking into account geopolitical factors. Rare earth elements are a group of critical minerals that are of great importance to modern technologies, ranging from electronics and renewable energy to defence systems. Afghanistan is known to possess significant deposits of these valuable resources, which have the potential to play a crucial role in global supply chains, especially in the face of ongoing rivalry between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America. The research problem of the considerations undertaken in this article is to assess the key challenges and opportunities in harnessing Afghanistan’s rare earth element resources after the Taliban’s return to power. The research conducted shows that despite having a significant amount of rare earth elements, Afghanistan lacks the infrastructure necessary to extract and process these valuable minerals. After the Taliban victory, the newly established government sees the potential benefit in extracting rare earth elements and is willing to align itself with China to exploit them.
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