Iran’s Engagement in Syrian Conflic t. Causes and Consequences

Main Article Content

Rafał OŻAROWSKI

Abstrakt

Since the 2011, Iran is deeply engaged in Syrian war in order to support and keep President Bashar al-Assad in power. Firstly, Iran started with political and diplomatic support and later turned into military and economic assistance. At the moment, it is believed that Syria is financially sustained by Iran. The main reason that Iran has determined for wide-scale engagement was the existential need for maintaining and then expanding its own regional power influences in the Middle East. If Syrian regime collapsed, Iran would be dealt with a big dilemma and it would loss Syria as a key military and political ally. Thus, Iran would have cut off his transit route to supply weapons to Lebanon for Hezbollah, as these transports still go across Syrian territory. It would surely diminish the Iranian position in the Middle East. Preventing such a case, Iran has been determined to engage in the Syrian conflict to a great extent, which, as a consequence, is charged with heavy costs. Although there is no exact data of Iran’s expenses for the Syrian War, it is supposed that this is in the range of 6 billion USD to 35 billion USD. At the moment, it can be said that engagement in Syrian war was beneficial for Iran, mainly in political sphere, yet the full consequences of this involvement will only be known in many months.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

Jak cytować
OŻAROWSKI, R. (2018). Iran’s Engagement in Syrian Conflic t. Causes and Consequences. Przegląd Strategiczny, (11), 201-210. https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2018.1.14
Dział
SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL DIMENSION
Biogram autora

Rafał OŻAROWSKI, University of Business and Administration in Gdynia

works as Associate professor in the Chair of Security at the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Business and Administration in Gdynia. He conducts his research on international security in the Middle East with a special focus on militarised non-state actors, international terrorism, Lebanese and Iranian policy in the Middle East. He is the author of two monographs, co-editor of many books and author of many scientific articles. He was visiting researcher in the Moshe Dayan Center in Tel-Aviv and the American University of Beirut and taught at the University of Calcutta and Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran.

Bibliografia

  1. Ansari A., Bassiri Tabrizi A. (2016) The View from Tehran, in: Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict, (eds.) A. Bassiri Tabrizi, R. Pantucci, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201608_op_understanding_irans_role_in_the_syrian_conflict_0.pdf (12.06.2018).
  2. Djalili M.-R., Kellner T. (2014), Iran’s Syria policy in the wake of the ‘Arab Springs, “Turkish Review”, Vol. 4, No. 4.
  3. Ehteshami A. (2002), The Foreign Policy of Iran, in: The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, (eds.) R. Hinnebusch, A. Ehteshami, London.
  4. Fidlis A. T. (2012), Roots of Alawite-Sunni Rivalry in Syria, „Middle East Policy”, Vol. XIX, No. 2.
  5. Fulton W., Holliday J., Wyer S. (2013), Iranian Strategy in Syria, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria (12.06.2018).
  6. Goodarzi J. M. (2006), Syria and Iran. Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East, London.
  7. Kam E. (2017), Iranian Military Intervention in Syria: A New Approach, „Strategic Asssessment”, Vol. 20, No. 2.
  8. Keynoush B. (2012), At Non-Aligned Helm, Iran Will Drive its Own Agenda, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/will-iran-be-able-to-lead-nam.html (12.06.2018).
  9. More Than 1000 Iranian Fighters Killed in Syrian Conflict (2016), https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-1000-fighters-in-syria/28133349.html (12.06.2018).
  10. Nadimi F. (2016), Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani Proxies: In Syria and Beyond, „Policy Watch” 2667, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-in-syria-and-beyond (12.06.2018).
  11. New Page in Iran-Syria Economic Relations (2018), “Financial Tribune”, https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/57826/new-page-in-iran-syria-economic-relations.
  12. Ożarowski R. (2017), Hizballah Involvement in the Syrian Conflict, „European Journal of Transformation Studies”, Vol. 5, No. 1.
  13. Rafizadeh M. (2015), $6–$35 Billion Annually to Assad: Stronger Iran, Mightier Assad?, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/6-35-billions-annually-to_b_7890164.html (12.06.2018).
  14. Rafizadeh M. (2016), Implications of growing Iran-Syria economic relations, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/09/30/How-Iran-is-gradually-owning-Syria-economically.html (12.06.2018).
  15. Syrian war: All you need to know about the Astana talks (2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/syrian-war-astana-talks-171029160554816.html (12.06.2018).
  16. Syria’s Assad depending on Iran financial aid (2014), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syriasassad-depending-iran-financial-aid-392275455 (12.06.2018).
  17. Yacoubian M. (2007), Syria’s Alliance with Iran. “Peace Brief”, https://www.usip.org/publications/2007/05/syrias-alliance-iran (12.06.2018).
  18. Yolcu F. H. (2016), Iran’s Involvement with Syrian Civil War: Background, Reasons and Alternatives, “Bilgi”, Vol. 18, No. 2.