AbstraktThis article addresses selected issues enmeshed into global economic governance debate. It focuss on a role of international institutions in transforming world order, in particular the rise of emerging powers increasingly categorised or acronymised as BRICS, their resources, power and vested interests. The main narrative brings close the phenomenon of the new reshuffling in multilateral development banking (MDB). The New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as ‘products’ of the third wave of MDB emergence, fit well into the process coined as ‘the recalibration of the world economy.’ It is expressed by shift of the centre of global economic gravity towards non-western actors and can be explained by arguments derived from game theory. They elucidate exit – voice nexus, where the cost of exit for both organisation leaders (Western donors) and members (EMDCs, BRICS) is fragmented multilateralism and where thecost of voice is decreasing capacity to influence principles and procedures of multilateral development lending. The article in the first section starts with overview of three waves of multilateral development banking, where the most recent of them is partially explained using game theory argument. Second section starts from accentuating common characteristics of NDB and AIIB and then examines the differences between NDB and AIIB – entities which emerged during the third wave. The final section provides summaries and conclusions.
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