Keywords
coercive diplomacy
Iran
nuclear proliferation
authoritarian resilience
Russia-Iran cooperation
sanctions evasion
How to Cite
Abstract
This study examines the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Iran from 1979–2025 through longitudinal case study analysis. Despite imposing substantial economic costs – including 60% reduction in oil exports (2012–2015) and 12.4% GDP contraction – sanctions failed to achieve strategic objectives. Iran’s uranium stockpile reached 408.6 kg at 60% enrichment by May 2025, demonstrating continued nuclear advancement. The Russia-Iran strategic partnership since 2022, involving $15 billion in bilateral trade and integrated payment systems, fundamentally undermined sanctions effectiveness. Findings reveal that authoritarian resilience, third-party circumvention, and geopolitical realignment limit economic coercion effectiveness, requiring fundamental revision of traditional sanctions frameworks in multipolar contexts.
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