Abstract
The aim of this article is to distinguish the key assumptions and instruments of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy towards territorial disputes in which this country is involved (with particular focus on the conflicts over islands and features in the South China Sea) through in-depth analysis of PRC’s policy in the conflict over Scarborough Shoal. According to the working hypothesis the events that took place in 2012 and ultimately led to the PRC’s de facto control over the shoal could be viewed as a model for the country’s future actions in the regional conflicts.
The article has been divided into three parts. The first one presents the subject matter of the dispute and its historical determinants. The latter characterizes the interests of individual countries involved in the conflict, their position, and the legal background to the dispute. Finally, the third section analyzes the events of 2012 and their implications, along with an attempt to isolate the elements that may constitute the model of the PRC’s future policy with regard to territorial disputes in which it is involved (“Scarborough model”).
The following research questions were asked for the purpose of structuring the analysis: 1) What is the factual and legal background to the Scarborough Shoal standoff? 2) How and by means of what instruments did China establish effective control of the atoll? 3) What is the role of the dispute in the context of the PRC’s remaining territorial claims over the South China Sea?
The article primarily uses the method of gathering and observing facts, as well as the decision-making method in the context of analyzing the positions of the states involved in the dispute. Also, the process method was used to present the genesis of the studied political processes.
References
Bautista L. (2013), The Philippine Claim to Bajo de Masinloc in the Context of South China Sea Dispute, “Journal of East Asia & International Law”, No. 2, http://dx.doi.org/10.14330/jeail.2013.6.2.08. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14330/jeail.2013.6.2.08
Beckman R. (2017), Scarborough Shoal: Flashpoint for Confrontation or Opportunity for Cooperation?, in: South China Sea Disputes. The Flashpoints, Turning Points And Trajectories, (ed.) K. Yang Razali, Singapore, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0007. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0007
Bonnet F.-X. (2012), Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal, “Irasec’s Discussion Papers”, No. 14, https://www.irasec.com/IMG/UserFiles/Files/04_Publications/Notes/Geopolitics_of_Scarborough_Shoal.pdf (15.04.2022).
Broderick K. (2015), Chinese Activities in the South China Sea. Implications for the American Pivot to Asia, Project 2049 Institute, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/150511_Broderick_Chinese_Activities_South_China_Sea_Pivot.pdf (15.04.2022).
Del Callar M. (2013), China’s New ‘10-dash line map’ eats into Philippine territory, “GMA Network”, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/319303/china-s-new-10-dash-line-map-eats-into-philippine-territory/story/ (18.04.2022).
Dutton P. (2011), Three Disputes and Three Objectives – China and the South China Sea, “Naval War College Review”, Vol. 64, No. 4.
Ericksen A., Kennedy C. (2017), China’s Maritime Militia, in: Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream, (ed.) M. McDevitt, “CNA Analysis & Solutions”, https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/irm-2016-u-013646.pdf (25.04.2020).
Fravel M. T. (2011), China’s Strategy in the South China Sea, “Contemporary Southeast Asia”, Vol. 33, No. 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/csa.2011.0136. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1355/cs33-3b
Gau M. Shen-Ti (2012), The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean Disputes in the South China Sea, “Ocean Development & International Law”, No. 43, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.647499. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.647499
Gazeta Prawna (2017), Filipiny: Zgoda na badanie podmorskiego Płaskowyżu Benham, https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/1039524,filipiny-zgoda-na-badanie-podmorskiego-plaskowyzu-benham.html (30.03.2022).
GMA News (2018), China registers names for 5 undersea features in Benham Rise, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/643314/china-registers-names-for-5-undersea-features-in-benham-rise/story/ (30.03.2022).
Graham E. (2013), China’s new map: just another dash?, “The Strategist”, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-new-map-just-another-dash/ (18.04.2022).
Gutierrez J. (2021), Overwhelmed by Chinese Fleets, Filipino Fishermen ‘Protest and Adapt’, “The New York Times”, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/11/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea-fishermen.html (30.03.2022).
Haddick R. (2012), Salami Slicing in the South China Sea, Foreign Policy, “Foreign Policy”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/ (23.04.2022).
Heydarian R. (2018), How the Scarborough Shoal came back to haunt China-Philippines relations, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2151923/how-scarborough-shoal-came-back-haunt-china-philippines (22.04.2022).
Huy Duong (2017), The Scarborough Shoal Dispute: Legal Issues and Implications, in: South China Sea Disputes. The Flashpoints, Turning Points And Trajectories, (ed.) K. Yang Razali, Singapore, https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0008. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814704984_0008
Jia Bing Bing (2014), A Preliminary Study of The Title to Huangyan Island (Scarborough Reef/Shoal), “Ocean Development & International Law”, No. 45, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2014.957971. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2014.957971
Kao S. (2014), Scarborough Shoal Dispute, China’s Assertiveness, and Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy, “International Journal of China Studies”, Vol. 5, No. 1.
Kazianis H. (2014), China’s 10 Red Lines in the South China Sea, “The Diplomat”, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/chinas-10-red-lines-in-the-south-china-sea/ (18.04.2022).
Kipler R. (2016), Why China Might Seek to Occupy Scarborough Shoal, “The Diplomat”, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-china-might-seek-to-occupy-scarborough-shoal/ (21.04.2022).
Lanteigne M. (2016), The South China Sea in China’s Developing Maritime Strategy, in: Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, (eds.) E. Fels, Truong-Minh Vu, Heidelberg, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26152-2_5. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26152-2_5
Lee Lai To, Chen Shaofeng (2009), China and joint development in the South China Sea. An energy security perspective, in: Security and International Politics in the South China Sea. Towards a cooperative management regime, (eds.) S. Bateman, R. Emmers, New York, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203885246. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203885246
Li Dexia, Tan Keng Tat (2014), South China Sea Dispute: China Has Evidence of Historical Claims, “RSIS Commentary”, No. 165.
Lingao A. (2017), Duterte: We can’t stop Chinese structures on Panatag Shoal, “CNN”, http://cnnphilippines.com (21.04.2022).
Mortimer C. (2017), China to build on disputed shoal in South China Sea, “The Independent”, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-beijing-philippines-scarborough-shoal-nine-dash-line-manila-a7637216.html (21.04.2022).
Moss T. (2012), China’s Not-So-Hard Power Strategy, “The Diplomat”, https://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-not-so-hard-power-strategy/ (21.04.2022).
O’Rourke R. (2018), Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=811054 (18.04.2022).
Paddock R. (2016), Chinese Vessels Leave Disputed Fishing Grounds in the South China Sea, “New York Times”, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/world/asia/south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal.html (22.04.2022).
Panda A. (2017), South China Sea: Is China Considering Construction Work at Scarborough Shoal Again?, “The Diplomat”, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/south-china-sea-is-china-considering-construction-work-at-scarborough-shoal-again/ (21.04.2022).
Permanent Court of Arbitration (2016), The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China). Press Release, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1801 (21.04.2022).
Poling G. (2013), The South China Sea in Focus. Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute, New York.
Poling G., Cooper Z. (2016), Developing a Scarborough Contingency Plan, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://amti.csis.org/developing-scarborough-contingency-plan/ (21.04.2022).
Quintos M. (2015), Artificial Islands in the South China Sea and Their Impact on Regional (In)Security, “FSI Insights”, Vol. II, No. 2, https://fsi.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2015-Vol-2-No-2-March-FSI-Insights-Artificial-Islands-in-the-South-China-Sea-Quintos.pdf (23.04.2022).
Ratner E. (2013), Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef, “The National Interest”, https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-9442 (23.04.2022).
Ravindran M. S. (2012), China’s Potential for Economic Coercion in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Study of the Philippines and Vietnam, “Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs”, Vol. 31, No. 3, https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341203100305. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341203100305
Reuters (2017), SE Asia meeting in disarray over sea dispute with China, https://www.reuters.com/article/asean-summit-chinasea-idINDEE86C05K20120713 (21.04.2022).
Strangio S. (2022), Philippines Calls Out Dangerous Chinese Actions Near Disputed Shoal, “The Diplomat”, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/philippines-calls-out-dangerous-chinese-actions-near-disputed-shoal/ (30.03.2022).
Symonides J. (2012), Spory terytorialne na Morzu Południowochińskim. Czy powrót “dyplomacji kanonierek”, “Stosunki Międzynarodowe”, No. 2, Vol. 46.
Tharoor I. (2014), Could this map of China start a war?, “The Washington Post”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/06/27/could-this-map-of-china-start-a-war/ (18.04.2022).
The Economist, Courting trouble, https://www.economist.com/china/2016/07/16/courting-trouble (21.04.2022).
United Nations (2009), CML/17/2009, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.
United Nations (2011), CML/8/2011, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 121, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (28.03.2022).
Vu Hai Dang (2013), A Bilateral Network of Marine Protected Areas Between Vietnam and China: An Alternative to the Chinese Unilateral Fishing Ban in the South China Sea, “Ocean Development & International Law”, No. 44, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2013.750984. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2013.750984
Zachrisen O. O. (2015), China’s political use of economic ties in territorial disputes. A comparative case study of Japan’s and the Philippines’ reactions, Trondheim.
Zhou Fangyin (2016), Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea Policy, “International Affairs”, 92:4, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12657. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12657
Zou Keyuan (2012), China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited, “Ocean Development & International Law”, No. 43, https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.647483. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2012.647483
Zou Keyuan (1999), Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?, “IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin”, Summer 1999.
License
Copyright (c) 2022 Paweł Luzak
![Creative Commons License](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Articles published in "Przegląd Strategiczny" are distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. License (CC BY 4.0). They may be copied, redistributed and shared only if appropriate credit is given.