In the Shadow of War... Strategic and Ideational Determinants of Russia’s Policy towards Belarus after August 2020

Abstract

In the aftermath of the fraudulent presidential elections held in August 2020, the authoritarian regime of Belarus, built around Aleksandr Lukashenko, found itself facing the most serious crisis in its history. Faced with an unprecedented threat to the legitimacy of power, Lukashenko decided to ask for support from Russia, which, until recently, he had accused of trying to interfere in the elections. The Kremlin’s decision to assist Lukashenko is considered one of the key factors, if not the most important, that determined the downfall of the Belarusian revolution. The price Belarus had to pay for Lukashenko’s retention of power was the growing economic, political, and military dependence on Russia, which resulted from the sanctions policy of the West. The scale of Belarusian dependence on Russia after 2020 is most clearly illustrated by the fact that Lukashenko was forced to make territory and infrastructure available to Russia in order to launch an aggression against Ukraine. Despite the fact that Russia has made Belarus so dependent that it has made it an accomplice of aggression, the Kremlin has chosen not to intervene more seriously in Belarusian politics, removing Lukashenko from power, nor to accelerate the process of integration of the two states; The aim of the article is to answer the questions: why, having at its disposal a broad (and virtually unlimited) set of tools for influencing Belarus, Russia ensured the stability of Lukashenko’s political regime – it did not use them for the permanent and institutionalised subjugation of Belarus, the reconstruction of the political regime there, and its penetration by pro-Russian forces? The article is empirical in nature and, in terms of the research method used, is based on an exegesis of the symbolic statements and authoritative actions of Russian and Belarusian policymakers, as well as a decision-making analysis maintained in the material and ideational strands of international relations. From a broader perspective, it is a critical contribution to considering the dimensions of the patron-client relationship between Russia and Belarus, as well as the determinants of Russia’s foreign policy decision-making process, both in realist and constructivist terms or ontological security.