Usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on the Basis of Experience of the Russian-Ukrainian War (2022–2025)
Journal cover Strategic Review, no. 18, year 2025
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Keywords

Russian – Ukrainian war
unmanned aerial system
unmanned aerial vehicle
aerial reconnaissance
artillery fire adjustment
air strike
fire damage
air drop
operation
electronic warfare
kamikaze drone
swarm attack
artificial intelligence

How to Cite

Rieznik, V., Sydorov, S., & Tatarenko, K. (2025). Usage of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on the Basis of Experience of the Russian-Ukrainian War (2022–2025). Strategic Review, (18), 109–127. https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2025.1.8

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to present the summarize of the experience of using unmanned aerial vehicles during the Russian-Ukrainian war in the period of 2022–2024. The methodological basis of the study is based on the principles of historicism, objectivity, and critical analysis of various sources. The authors used general scientific research methods, primarily analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, as well as special historical methods, including historical comparative studies, historical genetic and problematic chronological methods. The scientific novelty of the obtained results is that the authors for the first time in historiography revealed the strategic, operational and tactical content of the usage of unmanned aircraft during the Russian-Ukrainian war, identified the main forms and methods and trends of its use. Information on the main factors that influenced the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the Russian-Ukrainian war has been clarified and supplemented.
It has been established that the issue of the usage of unmanned aerial vehicles and its impact on the further development of military art is of considerable interest to the world scientific community. However, the incompleteness of events, constant tactical and technological changes that occur during an unfinished war and the secrecy of a significant array of sources have led to a relatively small amount of historiography on the topic. The use of unmanned aircraft was influenced by a combination of tactical, scientific, technological and economic factors. It was their influence that determined the direction of development of forms and methods of using unmanned aircraft. The main tasks performed by the parties’ unmanned aerial vehicles were to destroy enemy strategic rear facilities, fire on the enemy in operational and tactical depth, conduct aerial reconnaissance, and adjust artillery fire. Unmanned aerial vehicles were also used to provide logistical support to units in hard-to-reach areas, conduct electronic warfare, air defence and communications. The main forms of use of unmanned aircraft were air operations, systematic combat operations, air strikes of various scales, and special combat flights. The main methods of performing tasks were echeloned and single strikes, drops and launches of aircraft, barrage strikes, duty in certain areas, and flights with a variable profile. The article identifies trends in the development of the military art of unmanned aircraft, and outlines ethical and philosophical problems associated with attempts to introduce elements of artificial intelligence into the control system of strike unmanned aircraft systems. On the basis of the results obtained, the authors provide relevant recommendations.

https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2025.1.8
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