Abstract
President R. T. Erdoğan’s policy is complex and multifaceted – on the one hand aggressive, and on the other subdued. The aim of the article is to analyze of the strategy used by President R. T. Erdoğan in foreign policy in the context of the definition of smart power introduced by J. Nye. The paper poses the following research question: Does President R. T. Erdoğan’s foreign policy be described as smart power? The following research hypothesis poses in the paper: President R. T. Erdoğan’s foreign policy can be described as smart power, as he skillfully uses selected types of hard and soft power, and other tactics in his actions, strengthening Türkiye’s position on the international arena. The following methods were used: deduction and comparative analysis. The period from 2020 to 2024 was analyzed. The main conclusion of the considerations is as follows. President R. T. Erdoğan’s actions in foreign policy are not limited only to the use of hard and soft power, i.e. smart power as defined by J. Nye. Hence, the work includes the author’s proposal to expand J. Nye’s definition it to include aspects used by the President of Türkiye on the international arena, creating a new, extended definition, corresponding to the foreign policy of R. T. Erdoğan. The article also proposes the introduction of a concept opposed to smart power – imprudent power.
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