Słowa kluczowe
dezinformacja
propaganda
Tajwan
Ukraina
narracja antyzachodnia Article submitted:
Jak cytować
Abstrakt
Niniejszy artykuł przeprowadza analizę porównawczą rosyjskiej dezinformacji skierowanej na Ukrainę i chińskiej dezinformacji skierowanej na Tajwan, w odniesieniu do ich strategicznych narracji na temat Zachodu. Działania te mają na celu powstrzymanie zbliżenia danego kraju z zachodnim systemem sojuszy i poddanie się imperialistycznym ambicjom ich autorytarnych sąsiadów. Analiza opiera się na wywiadach z tajwańskimi ekspertami i badaniach ekspertów ukraińskiego think-tanku Detektor Media (Riaboshtan i in., 2022). Chociaż chińska propaganda może nie wykorzystywać wyraźnie motywu „upadającego Zachodu”, który jest wspólną cechą rosyjskiej propagandy wymierzonej w Ukrainę, to jednak ma podobne przesłanie: Zachód jako podżegacz wojenny, który czerpie zyski z chaosu.
Finansowanie
Międzynarodowy Fundusz Wyszehradzki - pobyt badawczy był możliwy dzięki stypendium wyszehradzko-tajwańskiemu.
Bibliografia
Adams W. C. (2015), Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews, in: Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: 492–505. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119171386.ch19
Ash T. et al. (2023), How to end Russia’s war on Ukraine, in: Chatham House Report, Chatham House, London, chap. 9.
Astuti Y. D., Attaymini R., Dewi M. S. R. (2022), Digital Media and War: Social Media as a Propaganda Tool for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in the Post-truth Era, in: Annual International Conference on Social Science and Humanities (AICOSH 2022), Atlantis Press: 19–27. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/978-2-494069-87-9_4
Baumann M. (2020), “Propaganda Fights” and “Disinformation Campaigns”: the discourse on information warfare in Russia-West relations, “Contemporary Politics”, 26(3): 288–307. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1728612
Brown R. (1958), How shall a thing be called?, “Psychological Review”, 65(1): 14–21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041727
Carey J. W. (2009), Communication as Culture, Revised Edition: Essays on Media and Society, Routhledge, https://www.routledge.com/Communication-as-Culture-Revised-Edition-Essays-on-Media-and-Society/Carey/p/book/9780415989763 (1312.2024). DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203928912
Cartwright B. et al. (2022), Detecting and responding to hostile disinformation activities on social media using machine learning and deep neural networks’, “Neural Computing and Applications”, 34(18): 15141–15163. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-022-07296-0
Chang H.-C. H., Haider S., Ferrara E. (2021), Digital Civic Participation and Misinformation during the 2020 Taiwanese Presidential Election, “Media and Communication”, 9(1): 144–157. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v9i1.3405
China will show restraint in deploying cyber tools (2021), Emerald Expert Briefings, oxan-db(oxan-db).
Cole J. M. (2022), Strategic Communication: the Case of Taiwan, Societal Resilience and Political Legitimacy: 96.
Cottiero C., Emmons C. (2024), Understanding and Interrupting Authoritarian Collaboration, The International Foundation for Electoral Systems, https://www.ifes.org/publications/authoritarian-collaboration (6.12.2024).
Cushman E. G., Avramov K. (2021), Eurosodom: Specifics of Weaponized Sexuality and Gender-Based Narratives in Contemporary Russian and Pro-Russian Disinformation, “ICONO 14, Revista de comunicación y tecnologías emergentes”, 19(1): 123–154. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7195/ri14.v19i1.1626
Dotson J. (2023), Beijing Dusts Off an Old Playbook with Disinformation about Taiwan Biological Warfare Labs, Global Taiwan Institute, 1 November, https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GTB-Vol-8.-Issue-20.pdf (6.12.2024).
EU vs Disinfo (2021), Disinfo: US biolabs have been developing new biological weapons in Ukraine, euvsdisinfo.eu, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/us-biolabs-have-been-developing-new-biological-weapons-in-ukraine/ (6.12.2024).
Executive Yuan (2021), Taiwan eases rules on US pork, beef imports,, https://english.ey.gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/b935c5ed-2476-4f95-8d9c-dd058791570a (13.12.2024).
Flockhart T., Korosteleva E. A. (2022), War in Ukraine: Putin and the multi-order world, “Contemporary Security Policy”, 43(3). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091591
Hartig F. (2015), Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12093
Hussain I., Shah M. N. H., Tabiullah (2023) The Russia-Ukraine war: an analysis of the geopolitical roots and the global dynamics, “Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ)”, 7(1): 276–289. DOI: https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/7.1.16
Hybrid Warfare Analytical Group (2021), How Russia Devaluates Ukraine, Uacrisis.org, 23 August, https://uacrisis.org/en/how-russia-devaluates-ukraine (14.12.2024).
Jarkovská L. (2020), The European Union as a child molester: sex education on pro-Russian websites, “Sex Education”, 20(2): 138–153. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14681811.2019.1634041
Lasswell H. D. (1927), The Theory of Political Propaganda, “American Political Science Review”. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1945515
Lasswell H. D. (1951), The strategy of Soviet propaganda, “Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science”, 24(2): 66–78. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1173235
Lim K. (2023), LGBTQIA+ Rights in Taiwan: Three Lessons for Asian Policymakers, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 21 February, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/lgbtqia-rights-in-taiwan-three-lessons-for-asian-policymakers/ (14.12.2024).
Lucas E., Pomerantsev P. (2016), Winning the information war. Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe, The Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington: 1–66.
Marigliano R., Hui Xian Ng L., Carley M. K. (2024), Analyzing Digital Propaganda and Conflict Rhetoric: A Study on Russia’s Bot-Driven Campaigns and Counter-Narratives during the Ukraine Crisis, “ResearchGate”. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3997295/v1
Matsuda Y. (2020), Changes in the Dynamics of the Taiwan Strait due to Taiwan’s Success in Controlling the Novel Coronavirus, “Asia-Pacific Review”, (27(7)): 57–79. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2020.1845447
Miskimmon A., O’Loughlin B., Roselle L. (2013), Strategic narratives: Communication power and the new world order, Routledge: 15–27. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315871264
Nimmo B. (2015), Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia’s propaganda machine works, and how to counter it, Stop Fake, Central European Policy Institute, https://www.stopfake.org/en/anatomy-of-an-info-war-how-russia-s-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/ (15.05.2025).
Nye Jr J. S. (1990), Soft Power, “Foreign Policy”, 80: 153–171. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580
Oleinik A., Paniotto V. (2024), Propaganda channels and their comparative effectiveness: The case of Russia’s war in Ukraine, “International Sociology”, 39(3). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/02685809241232637
Riaboshtan I., Pivtorak O., Bilousenko O. (2022), ‘Digging their own grave.’ An analysis of Russia’s anti-Western rhetoric about the war in Ukraine, detector.media, https://detector.media/in-english/article/201031/2022-07-16-digging-their-own-grave-an-analysis-of-russias-anti-western-rhetoric-about-the-war-in-ukraine/ (14.12.2024).
Schmid A. P. (2014), Al Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives, “ICCT Research Paper” [Preprint], https://icct.nl/publication/al-qaedas-single-narrative-and-attempts-develop-counter-narratives (15.05.2025). DOI: https://doi.org/10.19165/2014.1.01
Smagliy K. (2018), Hybrid analytica: Pro-Kremlin expert propaganda in Moscow, Europe and the US: A case study on think tanks and universities, The Institute of Modern Russia, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f8f41ef14aa13b95239af0/t/5c6d8b38b208fc7087fd2b2a/1550682943143/Smagliy_Hybrid-Analytica_10-2018_upd.pdf (15.05.2025)
Steele B. J. (2012), Defacing power: The aesthetics of insecurity in global politics, University of Michigan Press: 552–553. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000412
Szostek J. (2017a), Defence and Promotion of Desired State Identity in Russia’s Strategic Narrative, “Geopolitics”, 22(3): 571–593. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1214910
Szostek J. (2017b), Nothing Is True? The Credibility of News and Conflicting Narratives during “Information War” in Ukraine. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217743258
Szostek J. (2017c), The power and limits of Russia’s strategic narrative in Ukraine: The role of linkage, “Perspectives on Politics”, 15(2): 379–395. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271700007X
[TFC Disinfo Detector] A brief review of disinformation spread during elections in Taiwan, 2020–2022 (Part II) (2023), 台灣事實查核中心, https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/articles/9887 (14.12.2024).
“The West Is Freezing:” Russia Wants Others to Suffer Without Its Gas – UkraineWorld (2022), “Ukraine World”, 20 December, https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/analysis/ru-west-freezing (14.12.2024).
The West wants to fight against Russia to the last Ukrainian (2022), Detektor Media, https://disinfo.detector.media/en/post/the-west-wants-to-fight-against-russia-to-the-last-ukrainian (14.12.2024).
Treyger E., Cheravitch J., Cohen R. S. (2022), Russian Disinformation Efforts on Social Media, Rand Corporation: 58–69.
Licencja
Prawa autorskie (c) 2025 Dorka Takacsy
Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Miedzynarodowe.