British policy in the Balkans during the Czechoslovakian crisis on the example of Greece

Abstract

The article analyses British policy toward the Balkans during the Czechoslovak Crisis, with particular emphasis on Greece. The aim of the study is to demonstrate Greece’s place within British political plans and to assess the effectiveness of London’s actions in the region. The author employed a historical-political method based on the analysis of Foreign Office documents and diplomatic materials. On this basis, it is shown that Great Britain sought to limit its own political involvement in the Balkans while at the same time preventing an excessive growth of German influence. British policymakers accurately anticipated subsequent stages of the Third Reich’s expansion, including the Anschluss of Austria and the partition of Czechoslovakia, yet consistently avoided commitments that might have led to conflict with Germany. The analysis also demonstrates that London viewed proposals for anti-German blocs in Central and South-Eastern Europe with scepticism. Attempts to develop economic cooperation with Greece produced only limited results due to the weakness of mutual economic ties. British policy toward Greece and the Balkans was subordinated to a strategy of avoiding commitments and maintaining the balance of power in Europe.