The Battle of Varna

Abstract

The article is devoted to an analysis of the military campaign that culminated in the Battle of Varna on 10 November 1444 and to the causes of the defeat of the Christian forces commanded by King Władysław III. The research problem concerns the strategic and political conditions of the Varna campaign, which aimed to halt the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The author demonstrates the significance of the conflict for the history of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The aim of the study is to reconstruct the course of the campaign and identify the military and diplomatic factors that led to the defeat of the Christian army. The research is based on chronicle sources, historical literature, and an analysis of the strategic actions undertaken by both sides of the conflict. The author argues that despite the successes of the earlier campaign of 1443–1444, preparations for the new expedition were insufficient. An effective blockade of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles was not secured, Serbian support was lacking, and the Christian forces were considerably outnumbered by the Ottoman army. Moreover, the campaign was launched too late, which hindered operational activities. During the battle itself, the decisive factor was King Władysław’s premature attack on the Janissary positions with only a small force. The monarch’s death caused panic and the collapse of the Christian army. The author concludes that the defeat at Varna resulted from strategic mistakes, insufficient coordination among the allies, and an overestimation of the military capabilities of the Christian forces in comparison with the well-organized Ottoman army.