The Problem of Moral Luck by Thomas Nagel and Norvin Richards.

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Przemysław Strzyżyński

Abstract

The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the con- trol of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel.

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How to Cite
Strzyżyński, P. (2012). The Problem of Moral Luck by Thomas Nagel and Norvin Richards. Filozofia Chrześcijańska, 9, 71-89. https://doi.org/10.14746/fc.2012.09.05
Section
Osoba i wina

References

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  2. Nagel T., Traf w życiu moralnym, w: tenże, Pytania ostateczne, tłum. A. Romaniuk, Warszawa 1997, s. 37-53.
  3. Richards N., Luck and Desert, w: D. Statman, Moral luck, State University of New York Press 1993, s. 167-180.
  4. Słownik Języka Polskiego, http://sjp.pwn.pl/slownik/2530242/traf [dostęp 03.07.2012].
  5. Statman D., ed., Moral luck, State University of New York Press 1993.
  6. Williams B., Ile wolności powinna mieć wola?, tłum. T. Baszniak, T. Duliński, M. Szczubiałka, Warszawa 1999.
  7. Williams B., Traf moralny, w: tenże, Ile wolności powinna mieć wola?, tłum. T. Baszniak, T. Duliński, M. Szczubiałka, Warszawa 1999, s. 215-238.