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Putnam
realism
Matrix
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Abstrakt
Although there is a disagreement about how Putnam’s argument should be understood, it is possible to point to several elements of this argument which are common for many different reconstructions. In this paper I have tried to show that not all of them are unquestionable. And I want to propose a new way in which self-refutation of statement „I am a brain in a vat” may be understood. A form of this reconstruction is neutral for controversy about metaphysical realism or skepticism – it differs from the argument suggested by Putnam’s text. But I think that a story about envatted brains is simply a story about a language.
Bibliografia
Brückner A.L., Brains in a Vat, „The Journal of Philosophy” vol. LXXXIII, 1986.
Brückner A.L., Skepticism about Knowledge of Content, „Mind” vol. XCIX, 1990.
Forbes G., Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited, „The Journal of Philosophy” vol. XCII, 1995.
Müller O., Does Putnam’s Argument Beg the Question Against the Skeptic? Bad News for Radical Skepticism, „Erkenntnis” vol. 54, 2001.
Putnam H., Mózgi w naczyniu, w: tegoż, Wiele twarzy realizmu i inne eseje, przeł. A. Grobler, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998.
Putnam H., Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981.
Wright C., On Putnam’s Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XCII, 1992.
Licencja
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