Słowa kluczowe
Gruzja
smart power
siła miękka
Cerkiew prawosławna
neo-eurazjatyzm
Jak cytować
Abstrakt
Rosja zawsze była aktywna militarnie; jednak obecny reżim próbuje połączyć instrumenty siły twardej i miękkiej. Stosunki rosyjsko-gruzińskie charakteryzują napięcia i starcia. Prozachodnia polityka zagraniczna Gruzji powoduje zaniepokojenie Kremla. Pomimo że Federacja Rosyjska ma silną pozycję na Kaukazie, z uwagi na jej obecność wojskową w regionie, polityka stosowania siły inteligentnej uzyskała długotrwałą legitymizację. Takie środowiska jak pro-rosyjskie organizacje pozarządowe, inteligencja kulturowa i duchowieństwo promują pojęcia wspólnej kultury i wspólnych wartości. Podobne promowanie zazwyczaj towarzyszy negatywnej narracji skierowanej ku liberalnemu Zachodowi.
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