Abstrakt
Zwycięstwo Talibów w Afganistanie w 2021 r. nie tylko wzbudziło obawy geopolityczne, ale także wywołało pytania o politykę i strategie państwa dotyczące rezerw metali ziem rzadkich. Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest wskazanie, jak obecne zmiany polityczne w Afganistanie mogą wpłynąć na politykę surowcową w zakresie wydobycia metali ziem rzadkich, uwzględniając czynnik geopolityczny. Omawiane metale to grupa minerałów krytycznych o ogromnym znaczeniu dla nowoczesnych technologii, począwszy od elektroniki i energii odnawialnej, po systemy obronne. Wiadomo, że Afganistan posiada znaczne złoża tych cennych zasobów, które mogą potencjalnie odegrać kluczową rolę w globalnych łańcuchach dostaw, zwłaszcza w obliczu nieustającej rywalizacji między Chińską Republiką Ludową a Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Problem badawczy podjętych w tym artykule rozważań polega na ocenie kluczowych wyzwań i szans w wykorzystaniu metali ziem rzadkich w Afganistanie po powrocie Talibów do władzy pomimo zawiłości geopolitycznej. Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że pomimo posiadania znacznych ilości pierwiastków ziem rzadkich, Afganistanowi brakuje infrastruktury niezbędnej do wydobywania i przetwarzania tych cennych minerałów. Po zwycięstwie Talibów, nowo utworzony rząd dostrzega potencjalne korzyści z wydobycia metali ziem rzadkich i jest skłonny sprzymierzyć się z Chinami w celu ich eksploatacji.
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Licencja
Prawa autorskie (c) 2024 Rafał Kamprowski
Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Na tych samych warunkach 4.0 Miedzynarodowe.