Zrodzeni w popiołach: niepewność jądrowa „zwiększa” stabilność strategiczną

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Polina Sinovets
Tetiana Melnyk

Abstrakt

Artykuł analizuje wyzwania, jakie przed stabilnością strategiczną stawia nowy nuklearny porządek świata, obejmujące koncepcyjne warianty teorii odstraszania w ramach zimnej wojny, przełom technologiczny i krytyczną transformację postaw nuklearnych państw. Wbrew dotychczasowym publikacjom na ten temat twierdzimy, że w nowym porządku nuklearnym stabilność strategiczna zostanie utrzymana, a nawet może wzmocniona przez złożoną kombinację wyzwań, jakie stoją przed bezpieczeństwem, biorąc pod uwagę rosnącą niemożność deeskalacji wojny po jej wybuchu.

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Sinovets, P., & Melnyk, T. (2020). Zrodzeni w popiołach: niepewność jądrowa „zwiększa” stabilność strategiczną. Przegląd Strategiczny, (13), 43-59. https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2020.1.3
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Biogramy autorów

Polina Sinovets, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Ukraine

Polina SINOVETS – Associate Prof., PhD in Politial Sciences, Department of International Relations, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University; Head of Odessa Center for Nonproliferation (OdCNP), based at ONU. Author of more than 70 research publications in scientific journals of Ukraine, US, Russia. Scientific interest include nuclear policies of states, nonproliferation regime, nuclear deterrence theory. Member of editorial staff of international scientific journals: “ONU Herald”, “Political Life”.

Tetiana Melnyk, Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, Ukraine

Tetiana MELNYK – PhD Candidate; Research Fellow, Odessa Center for Nonproliferation based at the I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine. Tetiana also holds a Master degree in EU IR and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe (2018). Nuclear deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic security system is Tetiana`s main area of research interest and the topic of her PhD thesis. Ms. Melnyk has written several articles and abstracts in scientific journals of Ukraine and Czech Republic on NATO, US nuclear policy, nuclear deterrence, Euro-Atlantic security and international terrorism.

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