Słowa kluczowe
odstraszanie
kontrola zbrojeń
technologie rakietowe
sztuczna inteligencja
przestrzeń
strategia nuklearna
postawa nuklearna USA
postawa nuklearna Rosji
Jak cytować
Abstrakt
Artykuł analizuje wyzwania, jakie przed stabilnością strategiczną stawia nowy nuklearny porządek świata, obejmujące koncepcyjne warianty teorii odstraszania w ramach zimnej wojny, przełom technologiczny i krytyczną transformację postaw nuklearnych państw. Wbrew dotychczasowym publikacjom na ten temat twierdzimy, że w nowym porządku nuklearnym stabilność strategiczna zostanie utrzymana, a nawet może wzmocniona przez złożoną kombinację wyzwań, jakie stoją przed bezpieczeństwem, biorąc pod uwagę rosnącą niemożność deeskalacji wojny po jej wybuchu.
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Licencja
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