Abstract
In recent times there has been a widespread use of the military and other drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) in many fields, both in the military and civilian life. They are frequently used both by the armed forces of many states as well as by the private companies, including the Private Military Companies (PMC). The most controversial issue connected with the use of drones is their deployment in the counterterrorist operations, especially in the so called “ targeted killings”. Since September 7, in 2000, when a U.S. Predator drone flew over Afghanistan for the first time the drone programme has grown into perhaps the most prominent instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The United States has used drones to support ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and – particularly under President Barack Obama – to conduct the targeted killings of the leaders of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Those, last operations stir the public opinion and are the source of many controversies . This article describes the development and technical features (possibilities) of the armed-drones (military drones) and their efficiency in the counterterrorist operations. In the final section of this paper the risk connected with the proliferation of military drones was discussed and assessed.
References
Becker J., Shane S. (2012), Secret „kill list” poses a test of Obama principles and will, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on=al-queda.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (21.12.2015).
Bergen P., Tiedemann K. (2010), The Year of the drone: an analysis of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2012. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New American Foundation, 24.02.2010, http://vcnv.org/files/NAF_YearOfTheDrone.pdf (21.12.2015).
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (2014), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org (17.05.2014).
Cordesmann J. A. (2003), The lessons and nonlessons of the air and missile campaign in Kosovo, 17.9.2003, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/kosovolessons-ful.pdf (14.03.2014).
Currier C., Elliott J. (2013), The drone war doctrine we still know nothing about, „Pro Publica”, 26.02.2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/drone-war-doctrine-we-know-nothing-about. (21.12.2015).
Drone wars (2015), (eds.) P. Bergen, I. D. Rothenberg, Tampa.
Falk R. (2013), Ending perpetual war? Endorsing drone warfare?, „Foreign Policy Journal”, 1.06.2013, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/06/01/ending-perpetual-war-endorsing-drone-warfare (18.05.2014).
Franke U. E. (2013), Verbreitung von unbemannten Flugzeugen fuer den militaerischen Gebrauch, „Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte”, nf 37.
Gertler J. (2012), U.S. Unmanned aerial systems, CRS Report for the Congress, Washington.
Gwiazda A. (2015), Niepewna normalizacja stosunków polityczno-gospodarczych Iranu z Zachodem, „Przegląd Strategiczny”, nr 8.
Gwiazda A. (2013a), Archipelag niezgody, „Polska Zbrojna”, nr 12.
Gwiazda A. (2013b), Użyteczne, kontrowersyjne drony, portal „wpolityce.pl”, 9.08.2013, http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/163834-uzyteczne-kontrowersyjne-drony-krytycy-poslugiwania-siedronami-w-walce-ze-wspolczesnym-terroryzmem-zwykle-nie dostrzegaja-niewygodnychdla-siebie-faktow (18.05.2014).
Horowitz M. C. (2014), The looping robotics gap, „Foreign Policy”, No. 6.
Khan P. (2002), The paradox of riskless warfare, „Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly”, No. 3.
Kreps S., Zenko M. (2014), The next drone wars, „Foreign Affairs”, March–April, No. 2.
Libront K. (2013), Niemiecka awantura o drony, portal „geopolityka.org” (29.06.2013).
Liebich D. (2015), Will the Iran nuclear deal change the geopolitics oft he Middle East?, „Foreign Policy Journal”, 8.09.2015, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/09/08/will-the-irannuclear-deal-change-the-geopolitics-of-the-middle-east/ (21.12.2015).
Madej M. (2012), Drone war on terrorism – użycie bezzałogowych pojazdów latających (UAV) w walce z terroryzmem, „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, nr 3.
McKevely T. (2011), Inside the killing machine, „Newsweek” 13.02.2011.
Michaels D. (2013), Europe’s push into drones remains elusive, „The Wall Street Journal”, 9.10.2013.
Opposition wirft Ministerium Vertuschung vor (2013), „Frankfurter Allgemeine Politik”, 10.06.2013, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/Island/drohnen-affaere-opposition-wirft-ministerium-vertuschung-vor-122116437.html (1.12.2015).
Rokita J. (2013), Lista Obamy czyli o kłopotach polityki celowanych zabójstw, „Horyzonty Polityki”, nr 6.
Sching R. (2007), Unmanned aerial vehicles: revolutionary tools in war and peace, USAWC, Carlile Barracks.
Singer P. W. (2009), Wired for war. The robotics resolution and conflict in the 21st century, New York.
Strawser B. J. (2010), Moral predators, „Journal of Military Ethics”, Vol. 9, Issue 4.
Symonides J. (2014), Prawnomiędzynarodowe problemy użycia dronów w walce z terroryzmem. Debaty i kontrowersje, „Bellona”, nr 4.
USAF: Bojowe misje bezzałogowców w oparciu o niestabilne satelity (2014), portal „defence24”, 6.02.2014, http://www.defence24.pl/55266,usaf-bojowe-misje-bezzalogowcow-w-oparciuo-niestabilne-satelity (28.04.2014).
Watts J. (2013), Technology game changers, „The Futurist”, July–August, No. 4, s. 20–24.
Wesołowska E. (2013), Jemen – punkt zapalny, „Angora”, 18.08.2013.
Zaloga S. (2008), Unmanned aerial vehicles, robotic air warfare 1917–2007, Oxford.
License
Articles published in "Przegląd Strategiczny" are distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. License (CC BY 4.0). They may be copied, redistributed and shared only if appropriate credit is given.