Abstract
The aim of the presented research is to analyze the decision-making process in the EU with regard to imposing and extending sanctions against Russia and to assess the cause of the sutainability of decisions and agreements between EU Member States despite their different position towards sanctions. In particular, the article analyzes the decision-making process, dynamics and changes taking place within the Council’s working groups, such as COEST (Working Group on Eastern Europe and Central Asia) for Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Research shows that geopolitical and economic factors are very important in creating dynamics that takes place in advisory groups of the European Council; nevertheless, despite these differences, unanimity is observed that is largely the result of the actions of France and Germany.
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