The main reasons for the acceptance of violence by non-state armed groups in modern Afghanistan
PDF (Język Polski)

Keywords

contemporary Afghanistan
non-state armed groups
military violence
Afghan government

How to Cite

Jureńczyk, Łukasz. (2020). The main reasons for the acceptance of violence by non-state armed groups in modern Afghanistan. Przegląd Politologiczny, (1), 19–34. https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2020.25.1.2

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze the main reasons for the acceptance of violence by non-state armed groups in modern Afghanistan. The research problem is included in the question, what are the main reasons for the acceptance of military activity of non-state actors by the part of Afghan society? These are mainly radical Islamist groups, warlords and their illegal militias, but also terrorist and criminal organizations. Among the main reasons the author indicates the interference of the great powers, the occupation and activities of coalition forces, cultural conflict and violation of cultural values, corruption and incompetence of the authorities, internal conflicts and narco-business. They are of historical, political, cultural, social and economic nature and have psychological premises in their background. In addition, they are complex and interrelated. They are united by common elements, such as a different perception of the same phenomena by the parties to the conflict, a divergent worldview and a system of values, and collisional or conflicting goals and interests. Within the postcolonial approach to security, historical and contemporary relations with the great powers are of particular importance. Armed violence consumes thousands of victims each year in Afghanistan. The causes of this violence, the nature of the conflict and the specificity of the fighting parties mean that in the near future we should not expect a reduction in the level of armed violence in Afghanistan. The international community can’t turn its back on Afghanistan, because it would lead to an even more serious destabilization of the country and, in consequence, regaining power by the Taliban.

https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2020.25.1.2
PDF (Język Polski)

References

Ayoob M. (1980), The Roots of Conflict, w: Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, red. M. Ayoob, Australian National University Press, Canberra.

Briscoe I. (2013), Non-conventional armed violence and non-state actors: challenges for mediation and humanitarian action, May, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Non-conventional%20armed%20violence%20and%20nonstate%20actors,%20challenges%20for%20mediation%20and%20humanitarian%20action.pdf, 10.01.2020.

Cordesman A., Hess A. (2014), Prospects for transition In Afghanistan, w: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. Adjusting Western regional policy, red. J. Krause, Ch. K. Mallory IV, Routledge, London–New York.

Coupland R. M. (2001), Armed Violence, „M&GS”, no. 7.

Crawford N. C. (2016), Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016, August, http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDATE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf, 22.06.2018.

Czaputowicz J. (2012), Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Współczesne koncepcje, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

Dereń J. (2015), Afganistan: ofiara geopolitycznych gier czy wojownik etnicznych wojen, w: Afganistan 2014 – rok zwycięstwa czy rok porażki? Doświadczenia dla przyszłości, red. A. Drzewicki, G. Rdzanek, BEL Studio, Warszawa.

Englehart N. A. (2016), Non-state Armed Groups as a Threat to Global Security: What Threat, Whose Security?, „Journal of Global Security Studies”, no. 1(2).

Geib R. (2009), Armed violence in fragile states, „International Review of the Red Cross”, vol. 91, no. 873.

Gorodnichenko Y., Roland G. (2012), Understanding the Individualism-Collectivism Cleavage and its Effects: Lessons from Cultural Psychology, https://eml.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/IEA%20papervf.pdf, 15.01.2020.

Gruszczak A. (2011), Is NATO still needed? An unorthodox perspective on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the example of the Afghan conflict, „The Yearbook of International Security”.

Gryz J. (2007), Ewolucja znaczenia siły militarnej w polityce międzynarodowej, w: Afganistan: militarny i pozamilitarny wymiar stabilizacji. Materiały z konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej 12 kwietnia 2007 r., red. D. Strasburger i in., Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa.

Gwiazda A. (2007), Słabnące państwo, „Świat Idei i Polityki”, t. 7.

Harshé R. (2016), Situating Afghanistan in a globalizing world, w: Afghanistan Post-2014. Power configurations and evolving trajectories, red. R. Harshé, D. Tripathi, Routledge, New Delhi–London–New York.

Hoehn A. R., Harting S. (2010), Risking NATO: testing the limits of the alliance in Afghanistan, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.

Institute for Economics & Peace (2019), Global Terrorism Index 2019. Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf, 15.01.2020.

Jahangir A., Javaid U. (2018), Afghanistan Imbroglio: The Unintended Consequences of Foreign Interventions, „South Asian Studies”, vol. 33, no. 2.

Jauffret J. Ch. (2014), Afganistan 2001–2013. Kronika przepowiedzianego braku zwycięstwa, tłum. E. Cylwik, J. Sheybal, Wydawnictwo Dialog, Warszawa.

Jones S. G. (2010), In the Graveyard of Empires. America’s War in Afghanistan, W. W. Norton & Company, New York–London.

Jureńczyk Ł. (2007), Fundamentalizm muzułmański afgańskich talibów i ich stosunek do innych religii, „Polityka i Społeczeństwo”, nr 4.

Jureńczyk Ł. (2013), Wojna z talibami i Al-Kaidą. Afganistan w latach 1994–2012, Wydawnictwo Grado, Toruń.

Jureńczyk Ł. (2016a), Narkobiznes w Afganistanie, „Kwartalnik Bellona”, nr 1.

Jureńczyk Ł. (2016b), Polska misja w Afganistanie. Wojsko Polskie w operacji reagowania kryzysowego NATO, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, Bydgoszcz.

Kamiński T. (2008), Afganistan. Parła nist, Oficyna Wydawnicza Branta, Bydgoszcz–Warszawa.

Keane C. (2016), US-Nation Building in Afghanistan, Routledge, London–New York.

Koplan J. P., Rosenberg M., Krug E. (1998), Violence prevention: A public health policy, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta.

Krause J., Mallory Ch. K. IV (2014), Adjusting Western strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, w: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. Adjusting Western regional policy, red. J. Krause, Ch. K. Mallory IV, Routledge, London–New York.

Kulesa Ł., Górka-Winter B. (2012), From followers to leaders as ‘coalition servants’: the Polish engagement in Afghanistan, w: Statebuilding in Afghanistan. Multinational contributors to reconstruction, red. N. Hynek, P. Marton, Routledge, London–New York.

Langenfeld P. (2011), Afganistan. Dotknąłem wojny, Wydawnictwo ENDER, Ustroń.

Levi-Sanchez S. (2017), The Afghan-Central Asia Borderland. The state and local leaders, Routledge, London–New York.

Lawless G. J., Constantineau P., Dizboni A. (2017), A Hermeneutic Analysis of Military Operations in Afghanistan, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Maley W. (2002), The Afghanistan Wars, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

McQuinn B., Oliva F. (2018), Preliminary scoping report analyzing and engaging non-state armed groups in the field, United Nations System Staff College, Torino.

Modrzejewska-Leśniewska J. (2010), Afganistan, Wydawnictwo Trio: Warszawa.

Moïsi D. (2012), Geopolityka emocji, tłum. R. Włoch, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

O’Connell A. B. (2017), Why we aren’t ‘winning’ in Afghanistan, „The Washington Post”, 10 August, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-relying-too-much-on-military-power-in-afghanistan/2017/08/10/102a565e-7d19-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html?utm_term=.f7fecb9d7c68, 22.06.2018.

Ogdowski M. (2011), Z Afganistanu.pl. Alfabet polskiej misji, Wydawnictwo ENDER, Ustroń.

Olchowski J. (2010), Kultura i zjawiska dezintegracji i konfliktu, w: Międzynarodowe stosunki kulturalne, red. R. Zenderowski, K. Cebul, M. Krycki, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.

Pawłuszko T. (2012), Afganistan w polityce Stanów Zjednoczonych, w: Stracona dekada? Polityka bezpieczeństwa Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec „globalnych obszarów niestabilności” (Iraku, Iranu, KRL-D oraz Afganistanu) w latach 2001–2011, red. Ł. Smalec, Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.

Perito R. M. (2012), Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police. United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Washington, May, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR307.pdf, 22.06.2018.

Qassem A. S. (2016), Afghanistan’s Political Stability. A Dream Unrealised, Routledge, London–New York.

Rączkiewicz M. (2011), Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki w okresie prezydentury G. W. Busha w ujęciu regionalnym, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń.

Rietjens S. (2012), Between expectations and reality: the Dutch engagement in Uruzgan, w: Statebuilding in Afghanistan. Multinational contributors to reconstruction, red. N. Hynek, P. Marton, Routledge, London–New York.

Schroeder R. (2014), Not too little, but too late: ISAF’s strategic restart of 2010 in light of the coalition’s previous mistakes, w: Afghanistan, Pakistan and Strategic Change. Adjusting Western regional policy, red. J. Krause, Ch. K. Mallory IV, Routledge, London–New York.

Sellin J. Th. (1938), Culture Conflict and Crime, „American Journal of Sociology”, vol. 44, no. 1, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2768125seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, 22.06.2018.

Sepp K. I. (2006), Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, „Military Review”, October, Special Edition.

Sieff K., Salahuddin S. (2014), Mohammad Quasim Fahim: The first vice-president of Afghanistan, whose career was dogged by allegations of atrocities and corruption, „Independent”, 11 March, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/mohammad-qasim-fahim-the-first-vicepresident-of-afghanistan-whose-career-was-dogged-by-allegations-of-atrocities-and-corruption-9182663.html, 22.06.2018.

Sierakowska-Dyndo J. (2007), Granice wyobraźni politycznej Afgańczyków. Normatywno-aksjologiczne aspekty tradycji afgańskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa.

The Fund for Peace (2019), Fragile States Index. Annual Report 2019, https://fundforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/9511904-fragilestatesindex.pdf, 15.01.2020.

UNAMA (2018), Afghanistan. Protecting of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Annual Report 2017, 15 February, https://unama.unmissions.org/afghanistan-10000-civilian-casualties-2017-un-report-suicide-attacks-and-ieds-caused-high-number, 22.06.2018.

UNODC (2014), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014, November, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf, 22.06.2018.

UNODC (2018), Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, May, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Opium-survey-peace-security-web.pdf, 22.06.2018.

Whitlock C. (2019), In documents, US military trainers describe Afghan security forces as incompetent, unmotivated and rife with deserters, „Stars and Stripes”, 9 December, https://www.stripes.com/in-documents-us-military-trainers-describe-afghan-security-forces-as-incompetent-unmotivated-and-rife-with-deserters-1.610484, 15.01.2020.

Williams M. J. (2011), The Good War. NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Zając J. (2010), Państwa arabskie wobec europejskiej koncepcji demokracji i praw człowieka, w: Kulturowe uwarunkowania rozwoju w Azji i Afryce, red. K. Górak-Sosnowska, J. Jurewicz, Wydawnictwo Ibidem, Łódź.