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koalicje blokujące
Rada Unii Europejskiej
siła głosu
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Abstrakt
Przy wykorzystaniu autorskiego programu komputerowego wykonano symulacje głosowań w Radzie po wystąpieniu Wielkiej Brytanii z UE. W przypadku części z nich zastosowano innowację metodologiczną polegającą na odejściu od założenia, że powstanie każdej z możliwych koalicji jest równie prawdopodobne. Przeprowa dzona analiza wskazuje, że po Brexicie znacząco zmieni się zdolność członków Rady do tworzenia małych koalicji minimalnie blokujących. Jednocześnie ocena zdolności państw do blokowania decyzji w Radzie, dokonana w oparciu o Preventive Power Index, różni się zasadniczo od wyników analizy skupiającej się na budowie małych koalicji minimalnie blokujących. Prezentowane badania zostały sfinansowane przez Narodowe Centrum Nauki w ramach projektu no. UMO-2016/23/D/HS5/00408 (konkurs SONATA 12) zatytułowanego Wpływ brexitu i bezwarunkowego wprowadzenia systemu głosowania „podwójną większością” na proces decyzyjny w Radzie Unii Europejskiej.
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Licencja
Teksty opublikowane na łamach czasopisma "Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne" i udostępniane w formacie PDF objęte są licencją CC BY 4.0 (Creative Commons - Uznanie autorstwa). Kopiowanie i rozpowszechnianie dozwolone jest pod warunkiem uznania autorstwa.