To have your cake and eat it too: accountability under a preferential voting system
PDF (Język Polski)

Keywords

Voting rights regulations
preferential voting system
accountability system

How to Cite

Mikulska, A. (2014). To have your cake and eat it too: accountability under a preferential voting system. Przegląd Prawniczy Uniwersytetu Im. Adam Mickiewicza, 3, 167–198. https://doi.org/10.14746/ppuam.2014.3.11

Abstract

Informed by the findings in the economic voting literature and using an original dataset on Polish elections this research breaks away from this established practice and goes a step further by showing how economic conditions allow voters to distinguish between high/low performers and effectively attribute responsibility under open-list PR systems where voters can choose not only among parties but also among individual candidates. By integrating open-list design into the model of accountability this study transforms the way we think about the very act of voting.
https://doi.org/10.14746/ppuam.2014.3.11
PDF (Język Polski)

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