Keywords
fines
local government non-tax revenue
local political business cycle
JEL
H71
K14
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Abstract
The aim of this article is to conduct an analysis of non-tax revenue from fines and tickets in Polish local governments and to verify hypotheses covering their real causes. On the basis of a created dataset of revenues from tickets in the relevant budget divisions of 2,474 counties in Poland in the 2007–2017 period, the diversity of revenues from tickets in Polish counties was examined. Data analysis indicates that there is a group of counties in Poland where tickets and fines became the instrument of budgetary policy and a way to generate significant non-tax revenue. The results of econometric model estimation confirm a dependency between revenue from tickets and crime, the macroeconomic situation and expenditures on municipal police. A fall of revenues from tickets before local elections was not observed.References
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