Keywords
Patrick Devlin
legal moralism
Émile Durkheim
Herbert Hart
Durkheimian utilitarianism
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Abstract
In the article, I try to answer the question of whether Durkheimian utilitarianism, reconstructed on the basis of Jonathan Haidt’s idea, can justify the enforcement of morality by criminal law (i.e. whether it is an adequate theory of legal moralism). In the first part, I present what Durkheimian utilitarianism is and what its theses are, and in the second, using the interpretative key that Herbert Hart used in the debate with Patrick Devlin, I explain what moralistic position it is actually defending. Ultimately, I come to the conclusion that the main thesis of Durkheimian utilitarianism is the Hartian thesis on disintegration. However, the lack of an adequate empirical justification raises doubts as to whether it can constitute a satisfactory theory of the moral justification of criminalization.
Funding
National Science Centre (Poland)
References
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