Florian Znaniecki’s critical analysis of psychological laws

Abstract

The article presents a critical analysis of the psychological laws formulated by Florian Znaniecki
(1882–1958). It draws on Znaniecki’s The Laws of Social Psychology (1925), in which he conducted
a methodological critique of psychological laws existing at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The article was inspired by the observation that, despite the passage of time and changes in the
theoretical and methodological approaches in psychology, the objections raised by Znaniecki and
his line of argumentation remain relevant in many respects. This article examines Znaniecki’s
critique of psychological laws in the context of the requirements placed on statements serving
as scientific laws. It first presents an understanding of scientific laws from the perspective of
the philosophy and methodology of science. It then shows Znaniecki’s critical stance towards
arguments denying the possibility of formulating laws in psychology: he deemed these views unfounded.
Later, it presents Znaniecki’s critical analysis of specific types of laws. In the last section,
it discusses his argumentation concerning (i) the lack of universality of psychological laws,
(ii) the uniqueness of psychological phenomena, and (iii) the claim that the laws of social psychology
provide descriptions of psychological phenomena, and/or (iv) correlations rather than causal
explanations. The analyses conducted show that Znaniecki modelled his approach on the laws of
the exact sciences, despite his espousal of culturalism and his acceptance of a complex theoretical
and methodological perspective, consisting of the coexistence of anti-naturalistic assumptions in
the ontological dimension and respect for the criteria of naturalism in the methodological sphere,
without accepting naturalistic methods.