Keywords
competition
innovations
antitrust law
merger control
How to Cite
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Abstract
There have been broad and vigorous debates for several years over a relatively recent phenomenon of so-called killer acquisitions, whereby incumbent large companies (mostly with market dominance) preempt future competition by acquiring potential competitors (mostly start-ups) equipped with innovative technology. The article explores the economic implications of such transactions, and how their repercussions influence the approach of the antitrust authorities to this phenomenon. First, an initial explanation of the concept and idiosyncrasies of killer acquisitions is presented. Then, their effects on innovation and competition are discussed in more depth, considering the actual scale of this phenomenon and its empirical examples. This is followed by a brief description of the difficulties in identifying and assessing killer acquisitions in terms of their economic characteristics. The article’s methodology is based on the analysis of economic and legal literature on the subject matter, and partly on the dogmatic and legal analysis of antitrust regulations and practice. Based on the research findings it is suggested that, despite the conceptual vagueness of killer acquisitions, as well as their complex economic implications, there seems to be a growing belief that this is a real and significant problem, which cannot be solved solely with conventional antitrust tools, not to mention the market’s self-regulation. It does not appear that searching for an optimal response to the challenges posed by killer acquisitions will lead to the development of a silver bullet, if only because of the jurisdiction-specific economic and legal backgrounds.
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