Keywords
post-communist transition
democratisation
civil society
communist establishment
constitutionalism
constitutional economics
institutional design
authoritarian regimes
liberal democracy
capitalism
electoral systems
party systems
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Abstract
While there is a wealth of studies on selected aspects of economic and political transitions from communism, there are few, if any, analyses of the emergence of new political orders in terms of constitutional engineering, i.e. the adoption of the meta-rules governing the rules defining both the political structure and determining underpinnings of the ordinary law-making process. The paper begins with the review of menu of institutional choices related to type of government, electoral system and vertical organisation of the state and their impact on performance as reported in political science and constitutional political economy literature. It is posited that the binary outcome: democracy vs. autocracy is a function of two variables assuming two values: society (weak vs. autonomous sovereign citizen) and communist establishment (strong vs. weak). A strong communist state at the initial state of transition produces autocratic outcomes although proximity to Brussels may change political trajectory whereas a strong autonomous society generates trajectory leading to democracy. Surprisingly, the choice of the rules of political game bore little resemblance to what literature might suggest: ordinary political struggle has determined
the choice of institutions with constitutions as a legal act being the result rather than a product of conscientious intellectual design.
JEL: A10; A12; B25; P10; P20; P21; P30
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