Dignity as a value of the American constitution

Abstract

The paper presents comments on Michał Urbańczyk's book “Idea godności w orzecznictwie Sądu Najwyższego Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki” [The idea of dignity in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States] (Adam Mickiewicz University Press, Poznań 2019). Michał Urbańczyk rightly indicates that the shift in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, consisting in more and more frequent references to the concept of dignity in the justifications, took place in the 1940s. The concept itself first appeared in cases concerning criminal proceedings and the conduct of officers appointed to prosecute crimes. The ruminations and the analyses of the judicial decisions presented in Michał Urbańczyk's book contradict, partially at least, Aharon Barak’s view (“Human Dignity. The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015) according to which the approach to the idea of dignity in this judicial decision is fragmentary and undeveloped. However, one should agree with Barak that the Supreme Court treats dignity as a constitutional value only. The author of the present paper is of the opinion that a characteristic element of the American perception of dignity is accepting the historically evolving understanding of dignity, which changes together with social changes. Such an approach to dignity contrasts with the accepted in the Polish doctrine understanding of dignity as an element of natural law in the positive law system, which implies a rather static understanding of this concept.